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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Nonaccidental physical injuries children suffer at the hands of their parents 
occur along a continuum that ranges from mild to severe. At the outer edges of 
this continuum, one might find, on the one hand, a slight swat to the buttocks, 
and on the other, a brutal beating. In the United States, the normative 
consensus appears to be that outsiders to the family are appropriately 
concerned only when the physical injury at issue causes serious harm; any injury 
short of a serious one is exclusively “family business.” 
Consistent with this consensus, all states’ laws permit the use of 
“reasonable” corporal punishment;1 simultaneously, they all prohibit 
nonaccidentally inflicted serious injury. The latter is generally denominated 
abuse, although some states classify milder but still impermissible injuries as 
neglect, or simply “inappropriate discipline.” Thus, being able to distinguish 
between reasonable corporal punishment and maltreatment—whether this is 
formally denominated abuse or neglect—is critical for the relevant actors: 
parents who use corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool, child protective 
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 1. As used here and throughout this article, the word “reasonable” is a legal term of art meaning 
“acceptable.” See infra IIA (setting out examples of corporal punishment legislation using this term). In 
law more generally, “reasonableness” describes a range of behavior that society or a particular 
community deems “normal” and thus not an appropriate basis for liability, guilt, or action otherwise. Its 
corollary in the social sciences is the term “normative,” which is used throughout this article in the 
empirical sense, meaning a behavior that is practiced and accepted by a significant proportion (that is, 
at least a quarter) of the population or subgroup at issue. See also infra note 8 (explaining the 
relationship between scientific normativeness and cultural and legal norms, including in particular 
parental autonomy norms). 
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services (CPS) staff who are required by statute to intervene in the family to 
protect children subject to or at risk of abuse, and courts adjudicating issues 
arising in connection with these cases. The integrity of the distinction and of the 
methodology employed to make it is also critical for a society that is 
prominently committed to both family autonomy and child welfare, and in 
particular to protecting the integrity of the family when it promotes (or at least 
does not harm) child welfare, and to intervening in the family when it fails in its 
related obligations. 
Unfortunately, few if any states have sufficiently defined the relevant terms 
“reasonable corporal punishment” or “maltreatment” (abuse or neglect) to 
consistently guide the relevant actors (those in a single system) in their 
exercises of discretion; nor have they established a coherent methodology for 
sorting injuries along the continuum of nonaccidental physical injuries. That 
administrative regulations and policies promulgated by state and local CPS 
departments often narrow agency discretion helps CPS itself to be more 
consistent and may help families know what to expect when they are dealing 
with CPS. But because appellate courts do not appear to give much deference 
to agency interpretations of the statutory definitions, these regulations and 
policies do little to guide the courts’ own exercise of discretion. Moreover, to 
the extent that the law in statutes and judicial opinions is either less precise or 
even different from the law as it is applied by CPS, the public and parents are 
inevitably confused or misled. As a result, decisionmaking about whether an 
injury or incident remains in the realm of family business or has crossed the line 
into the impermissible varies, reflecting a multiplicity of purely personal 
viewpoints, religious and political ideologies, and academic or disciplinary 
training and requirements. In turn, institutional treatment of and outcomes for 
children and families are often inconsistent.2 
The status quo has been defended or at least explained on several grounds. 
The vagueness of abuse definitions has been consistently upheld on policy 
grounds—specifically on the argument that it is important for authorities to 
retain flexibility to call injuries as they see them given that, particularly in a 
diverse society, abuse might appear in unexpected forms.3 The difficulty of the 
 
 2. Scott A. Davidson, When is Parental Discipline Child Abuse? The Vagueness of Child Abuse 
Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 403, 403 (1995–1996) (“[T]he broad language of much of the 
legislation provides little guidance in situations in which the child’s punishment is closer to reasonable 
parental discipline. As a result, courts apply child abuse laws inconsistently in borderline cases.”); id. at 
412 (noting that “parents who desire to obey the [vague] statute[s] could have difficulty in 
understanding whether it prohibits their method of abuse”); id. at 414–15 (“[V]ague child abuse 
statutes create uncertainty in the minds of mandated reporters.”); id. at 415 (“[I]dentifying and 
protecting abused children requires the coordinated efforts of those professionals required to report 
cases of abuse. This interdisciplinary involvement results in confusing and ambiguous definitions of 
child abuse. Consequently, professionals in the various disciplines often conclude differently about 
whether a parent has abused a child.”). 
 3. The first legal scholar to focus on the vagueness of child-abuse definitions and the 
extraordinary discretion this affords child-welfare authorities continues to be the most prominent voice 
on the issue. See Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for 
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definitional project has also been acknowledged. This difficulty stems both from 
the relatively mundane problem of how textually to craft the definitions so that 
they capture all and only what we want them to capture, and from the related 
(but infinitely more complex) problem of how to resolve the ideological 
tensions at play in this area. 
Each of these explanations has merit. First, we do not want to be left with 
definitions so fine that they disallow necessary protective interventions based in 
different (nonnormative) or unprecedented and harmful parenting practices. 
Although such instances are infrequent, the CPS community’s relatively recent 
experience with non-European immigrants who engage in unusual (for the 
United States) parenting practices, including family-formation practices, folk-
medicine practices, and disciplinary practices,4 demonstrates that concerns 
about flexibility are both real and legitimate.5 Second, it is incredibly hard to 
craft precise statutory language; the annals of legislative history attest to the 
truth of this proposition. It is especially tricky to do so in an ethnically, 
religiously, and politically diverse setting like the United States, particularly 
when the context relates to the intersection of intimate family matters and the 
relationship of the state to the family. Legislators and elected judges operating 
in a legal context where definitions already exist are likely to be better off if 
they leave things alone; the alternative, at least politically, is unattractive: 
entering the culture war that inevitably would result from efforts to codify 
different rules that respectively privilege and de-privilege particular groups’ 
parenting norms. 
Nonetheless, the premise of this article is that the distinction between 
permissible and impermissible corporal punishment is too important to leave to 
the only loosely guided discretion afforded by modern child-abuse definitions. 
In particular, three negative effects of the status quo beg for at least a periodic 
reevaluation of the prospects for more-precise tools to make this distinction.6 
 
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1001 (1975) (“Because the statutes do not reflect a 
considered analysis of what types of harm justify the risks of intervention, decision-making is left to the 
ad hoc analysis of social workers and judges.”). See also Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics 
of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 559 (2007) [hereinafter Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric 
Research] (discussing the “‘know it when you see it’ test for child maltreatment”); Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the 
Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 428–29 (2005) [hereinafter Coleman, Storming the 
Castle] (discussing the vagueness of typical statutory definitions of child abuse, including this flexibility 
rationale, and citing cases that have used this rationale to reject constitutional “void for vagueness” 
challenges to the definitions); Davidson, supra note 2, at 409–11 (discussing the failure of vagueness 
challenges to child-abuse laws and the flexibility rationale that has supported the decisions). 
 4. See Alison Dundes Renteln, Corporal Punishment and the Cultural Defense, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258-61 (Spring 2010) (describing such unconventional disciplinary practices). 
 5. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and 
Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 717–18 (1998) (generally describing this immigration 
phenomenon). 
 6. Several legal scholars and student commentators have contributed to this evaluation over the 
years since states first began enacting mandatory reporting laws. Professor Michael Wald began the 
process. See generally Wald, supra note 3. See also Howard Davidson, The Legal Aspects of Corporal 
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We have already noted two of these effects: the law’s failure to fulfill its 
expressive function (or the law’s signaling problems) and inconsistent case 
outcomes. The third is the risk of error in both directions—false-positive and 
false-negative findings of maltreatment—and the consequences of resulting 
errors for children and families.7 This risk is an inevitable result of the 
inconsistencies that plague the system. Importantly, errors (both ways) also 
occur because—other than those respecting egregious physical harm—the 
definitions do not codify a considered or generally accepted sense of the nature 
of the harm the state intends to prohibit. Again, this has been left mostly 
unresolved, either purposefully or by default. This means that the definitions 
fail to provide decisionmakers with information about the right kinds of cases to 
pursue. The ultimate objective of this article is to propose policy reforms that 
will ameliorate the risk of errors as well as the systemic inconsistencies and 
signaling problems already described. 
We proceed toward this end on the assumption that reforms will be viable in 
the long run only if they are the product of a careful accommodation of the 
delicate political considerations at stake in matters of state–family relations and 
of the medical and social-science evidence that explains when and how children 
suffer harm. Specifically, we suggest policy reforms that (1) preserve the 
traditional structure and substance of reasonable corporal-punishment 
exceptions to child-abuse law, both of which are themselves premised on a 
generous reading of parental-autonomy norms,8 and (2) require decisionmakers 
 
Punishment in the Home: When Does Physical Discipline Cross the Line to Become Child Abuse?, 17 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 18 (1997); Davidson, supra note 2; Dyanne C. Greer, Child Abuse and 
Discipline: A Parental and Prosecutorial Dilemma, 17 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 30 (1997); Kandice K. 
Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense—Reasonable and 
Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (1998). Social scientists have separately 
explored the issue of how to define abuse. See generally JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI & ROSINA M. 
BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE (1979); BARBARA LOWENTHAL, ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE 
EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO THE IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTION OF CHILD MALTREATMENT (2001); 
MARK A. WINTON & BARBARA A. MARA, CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACHES (2001). And a few scholars have taken a multidisciplinary approach to the problem. See, 
e.g., Robert E. Larzelere et al., Nonabusive Spanking: Parental Liberty or Child Abuse?, 17 CHILD. 
LEGAL RTS. J. 7 (1997) (proposing a paradigm for determining how and where to draw the line 
between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse framed according to legal constraints and informed 
in relevant ways by science); Kimberlie Young, An Examination of Parental Discipline as a Defense of 
Justification: It’s Time for a Kindlier, Gentler Approach, 46 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 7. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 417–19 (discussing the problem of false-
positive and false-negative findings of maltreatment in general); Davidson, supra note 2, at 418–19 
(discussing this problem as applied to corporal-punishment cases in particular, noting that 
many of the current child abuse statutes provide juries with unstructured and unguided 
discretion to distinguish between reasonable parental discipline and child abuse. Because this 
is often an equivocal judgment, some parents who do in fact abuse their children . . . escape 
the net in which legislation has attempted to catch them. . . . Conversely, the parents who are 
caught in the net when the child is really not in danger of future abuse are also victims of 
vague legislation.). 
 8. Norms are customary or widely held beliefs that may either influence or be influenced by law. 
Parental autonomy norms, in particular, are widely held beliefs about the primacy of parents and 
parental decisionmaking as against the state and decisions it might make in regards to the child. See 
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to take systematic and consistent account of all relevant and valid evidence, 
including medical and social-science evidence, that can shed light on the 
reasonableness of parents’ actions. We adopt this approach for two reasons. 
First, it is the reality on the ground that parental-autonomy norms interact 
and even sometimes compete with medical and social-science perspectives as 
the line is drawn in individual cases between reasonable corporal punishment 
and maltreatment. Although this article treats only the institutional actors, 
almost everyone involved in these cases uses one or the other or a hybrid 
approach to doing the line-drawing work required under the rules.9 This 
includes parents who use corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool; their 
neighbors who have to decide whether to report them for child abuse; CPS 
workers who process reports, investigate cases, and decide whether to 
substantiate them; and judges who adjudicate claims of excessive corporal 
punishment. 
Second, although legal reform is sometimes warranted in the face of the 
status quo, we do not believe that such confrontation is necessary here. It makes 
sense that parental-autonomy norms and scientific knowledge should govern 
the process of arriving at better definitions of reasonable corporal punishment 
and physical abuse, and of sorting individual incidents and injuries along the 
continuum of nonaccidental physical injuries. This approach best reflects what 
history and social science tells us is good for children: a child-rearing model that 
recognizes and establishes parents as the children’s “first[,] best” caretakers10 
and that intervenes in the family only when necessary to protect the child from 
harm that would be greater than that inevitably caused by the state’s own 
intervention.11 This approach also reflects appropriate respect for parents’ 
traditional role and the “rights and responsibilities” paradigm that has long 
governed American law in this area. Correspondingly, it acknowledges both 
that the state cannot replace parents as the children’s “first[,] best” caretakers, 
 
infra III.A (describing parental-autonomy norms and how these have influenced the development of 
both federal constitutional and state laws governing decisionmaking about and on behalf of the child). 
Individual parenting practices may or may not be normative in the empirical sense, see supra note 1. 
Furthermore, nonnormative practices may or may not trigger state interference with parental 
autonomy. Formally, the trigger for state action is a sense that serious harm is being caused or risked by 
parental behavior. Although normativeness often properly influences that sense, it is not and should 
not always be dispositive. See infra notes 80, 207, 209–223 and accompanying text (discussing the role of 
normativeness as a factor in the decision whether to find reasonable corporal punishment or abuse). 
 9. Not everyone is implicated in this process, however. For example, some parents beat their 
children for reasons unrelated to discipline, some neighbors report parents who use corporal 
punishment not because they believe they are abusing their children but because they dislike them, and 
some social workers and judges discriminate against families based simply on their race or cultural 
background. 
 10. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1–
2 (4th ed. 2009) (describing parents’ constitutional authority and their status in this context as “first 
best” caretakers). 
 11. See generally Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3 (describing the harm that state 
intervention in the family can do to children, even in circumstances where the states’ motive is to 
protect them). 
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and that the state has a proper role to play when parents make too much of 
their rights and too little of their responsibilities, causing a net loss to their 
children in the process. 
Given these considerations and our objectives—to ameliorate systemic 
inconsistencies, signaling problems, and false-positive and false-negative 
errors—our principal suggestion is for policymakers to codify “functional 
impairment” as the harm the state intends to prohibit. The term, adapted from 
the medical sciences, refers to short- or long-term or permanent impairment of 
emotional or physical functioning in tasks of daily living.12 (Currently, most 
states’ maltreatment definitions prohibit practices and injuries that may lead to 
functional impairment.)13 Correspondingly, we encourage adoption of functional 
impairment as the standard for evaluating the reasonableness of the force used 
and thus for drawing the line between reasonable corporal punishment and 
abuse. We promote this standard to ensure that the state has the authority to 
intervene in the family in the face of good evidence that a child has suffered or 
risks suffering important disabilities, and to restrict state authority to intervene 
merely to mediate suboptimal conditions. Relatedly, this standard serves to 
assure, to the extent possible, that the public’s wisdom regarding the normative 
use of corporal punishment is balanced with medical and scientific knowledge 
of harm to the child. 
Basing decisionmaking about the reasonableness of corporal punishment on 
a combination of parental-autonomy norms and scientific evidence about harm, 
as this functional-impairment test would do, is not new. For example, many 
maltreatment statutes and regulatory schemes are expressly premised on both a 
respect for family privacy and a focus on child well-being. And California’s 
Attorney General has suggested that scientific knowledge about the 
effectiveness of corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool should factor into the 
 
 12. E. Jane Costello et al., The Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth Functional Impairment and 
Serious Emotional Disturbance, 12 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1137, 1137 (1996). See generally, AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 
1994) (DSM-IV); Bedirhan Ustun & Cille Kennedy, What Is “Functional Impairment”? Disentangling 
Disability From Clinical Significance, 8 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 82, 82 (2009) (“Functional impairment 
refers to limitations due to the illness, as people with a disease may not carry out certain functions in 
their daily lives.”); id. at 83 (stating “the DSM-IV term ‘functional impairment’ is not specifically 
defined. It is used to mean limitations in the social and occupational spheres of life”) (emphasis in 
original); id. (clarifying that a “disorder must be associated with either distress or [functional 
impairment]” before a diagnosis can be rendered). Consistent with this definition, “harm” throughout 
this article is thus defined as serious immediate or delayed impairment in functioning, including 
physical injury, emotional injury, and behavioral maladjustment. See also infra III.B and notes 193–195 
(elaborating on this concept and applying it to the problem of sorting reasonable corporal punishment 
from abuse). 
 13. See infra II.A (setting out and discussing examples of typical state provisions). See also supra 
note 12 (describing how functional impairment operates in this way in the more-typical medical 
context). 
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evaluation of whether it is legally reasonable to spank a toddler.14 However, 
these initiatives are not systematic and often lack rigor; they do not necessarily 
reflect a considered evaluation and reconciliation of the relevant norms and 
scientific knowledge, or of whether basing a decision on either or both in 
combination makes sense in a given situation. Nor have they ameliorated the 
negative effects that are our target: the failure of the law to fulfill its expressive 
function, inconsistent case analyses and outcomes, and false-positive and false-
negative errors. We hope that in its multidisciplinary approach and system 
descriptions, and in its related suggestions for definitional and methodological 
reform, this article will begin to do some of this work. In the process, we hope 
that it will dissolve some of the long-standing conceptual and communications 
impasses among the various affected disciplines. 
The article proceeds as follows: Part II describes what is known about how 
the relevant institutional actors—legislatures, CPS, and courts—currently find 
and define the line between reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment.15 
Part III separately describes the parental-autonomy norms and scientific 
knowledge that currently compete for primacy in the discourse about corporal 
punishment and, as far as we can tell, largely contribute to decisions about the 
lawfulness of particular incidents “on the ground.” Part IV begins with an 
argument for definitional and methodological changes that reflects both 
parental-autonomy norms and scientific knowledge and follows with specific 
suggestions for policy reform. These suggestions include proposals for 
redefining reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment and for sorting cases 
along the continuum of nonaccidental physical injuries. 
II 
 
HOW THE RELEVANT LEGAL ACTORS DEFINE AND DRAW THE LINE 
BETWEEN REASONABLE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND ABUSE 
The three legal institutions responsible for where and how the states draw 
the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse are the state 
legislatures, which announce and define allowances and prohibitions in the first 
instance; CPS agencies and professionals, also known as departments of social 
services or DSS, which administer the legislative mandates and thus most 
directly engage families and children; and the courts, which are charged with 
interpreting legislation in the last instance, and which thus act as a check on 
decisions made by CPS. In an effort to develop a comprehensive sense of how 
each of these institutions makes decisions in this area and, in particular, if and 
 
 14. 80 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. No. 97-416 (1997). California law permits reasonable corporal 
punishment but defines this narrowly as “age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks.” CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 300 (2006). 
 15. Because it is beyond the scope of this article to consider how children and parents are treated 
once maltreatment has been found, we do not discuss actors such as therapists and family counselors, 
who are also important but who are involved only after this point. 
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how they might differ in their approaches, we conducted three studies. The first 
involved a cataloging and examination of all the states’ civil legislation defining 
child abuse and reasonable corporal punishment. The second involved a series 
of interviews with CPS professionals, including CPS directors, supervisors, and 
frontline social workers in counties in several states across the country. Our 
interviews were designed to establish the degree and nature of the discretion 
CPS professionals have as they evaluate cases involving parental claims of 
reasonable corporal punishment. The third study involved a cataloging and 
examination of all of the states’ published judicial opinions in civil cases 
concerning the definition of child abuse and the evaluation of reasonableness in 
the corporal-punishment setting. The results of this data collection are 
described below. 
A. Legislatures 
All United States jurisdictions have statutory definitions of child abuse 
consistent with the medical model of child abuse, which focuses specifically on 
the immediate and short-term physical effects of abuse on the child.16 Child-
abuse definitions typically appear in both the criminal and civil sections of a 
state’s statutory code.17 Definitions in the states’ civil codes—which are the 
focus of this article—typically appear in mandatory child-maltreatment-
reporting statutes or in juvenile-court-jurisdiction statutes. The former provide 
guidance to mandated reporters and the latter establish the basis for the state to 
exercise jurisdiction over the child and family.18 
1. Features of Typical Statutory Abuse Definitions 
In general, states define physical abuse of a child to include harm or 
threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare, nonaccidental physical injury, or 
serious physical injury inflicted by an act or omission of a parent or another 
adult responsible for the child’s care. Regardless of their terminology, the 
definitions focus on harm or injury to the child. Most employ the terms physical 
harm or physical injury.19 Additionally, many states classify as abuse acts or 
omissions that create a risk or substantial risk of physical injury or harm. 
Several states require not only a finding of physical injury but also a 
 
 16. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT 2 (2007), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/ 
define.pdf. Medical models focus on the child, specifically on the physical consequences of the parental 
conduct for the child, rather than on the motivation of the parent. See CLIFFORD K. DORNE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CHILD MALTREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, PUBLIC POLICY AND 
RESEARCH 89–110 (Willow Tree Press 3d ed. 2002) (1962) (describing the emergence of the medical 
model of child abuse in the United States). 
 17. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect (2010), 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/can/defining/state.cfm. This website provides definitions applicable in the 
civil law context. 
 18. Id. 
 19. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68(2)(a) (West 2006) (“[a]ny nonaccidental physical injury”). 
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determination that the injury harms the child or impairs the health of the child.20 
On the other hand, in Arkansas, certain intentional or knowing acts constitute 
abuse whether or not the child sustains physical injury. For example, a parent 
who “[s]trik[es] a child six . . . years of age or younger on the face or head” or 
“[i]nterfer[es] with a child’s breathing,” among other acts, has abused his or her 
child under the statute regardless of injury to the child.21 
A few states define abuse to include only nonaccidental physical injuries 
that are “serious.” For example, Pennsylvania defines child abuse as “[a]ny 
recent act or failure to act . . . which causes non-accidental serious physical 
injury to a child under 18 years of age” or “which creates an imminent risk of 
serious physical injury to a child under 18 years of age.”22 The statute further 
defines “serious physical injury” to mean an injury that “causes a child severe 
pain; or significantly impairs a child’s physical functioning, either temporarily or 
permanently.”23 North Carolina also employs the language “serious physical 
injury.”24 
Although state statutory definitions of physical abuse are similar in that they 
emphasize harm to the child or nonaccidental physical injury, minor variations 
among definitions exist. The most notable variation among definitions is their 
level of specificity. Just over half of state definitions contain only broad 
language and fail to provide specific examples of injuries or acts constituting 
physical abuse or to elaborate otherwise on the meaning of physical harm or 
injury. For example, Iowa’s definition provides that “[c]hild abuse or abuse 
means any non-accidental physical injury, or injury which is at variance with the 
history given of it, suffered by a child as the result of the acts or omissions of a 
person responsible for the care of the child.”25 In contrast, other states 
enumerate within their definitions specific injuries or acts that constitute 
physical abuse or otherwise expand on the definition of physical harm or 
physical injury. For example, Arkansas’ statutory definition provides a list of 
“intentional or knowing acts, with physical injury and without justifiable 
 
 20. E.g., 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (defining an abused child as 
“a child whose parent or [other responsible party] inflicts . . . physical injury, by other than accidental 
means, which causes death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional health, or loss or 
impairment of any bodily function”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) 
(defining abuse as “the physical . . . injury of a child . . . under circumstances that indicate that the 
child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed”). 
 21. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(vii)(a), 12-18-103(2)(A)(vii)(c) (2009). 
 22. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6303(b)(1)(i), 6303(b)(1)(iii) (West 2001) (emphasis added). 
 23. § 6303(a)(1)–(2). 
 24. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101(1)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). 
 25. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68 (West 2006). Likewise, North Carolina defines an “abused 
juvenile” as “[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker 
inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a serious physical injury by other than accidental 
means; creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by 
other than accidental means, [or] uses or allows to be used upon the juvenile cruel or grossly 
inappropriate procedures or cruel or grossly inappropriate devices to modify behavior.” N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 7B-101 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). 
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cause”26 that constitute abuse, as well as a list of “intentional or knowing acts, 
with or without physical injury”27 that constitute abuse. Among the acts that 
constitute abuse with a showing of physical injury are “[t]hrowing, kicking, 
burning, biting, or cutting a child; [s]triking a child with a closed fist; [s]haking a 
child; or [s]triking a child on the face or head.”28 Similarly, Florida’s statute 
provides that abuse is “any willful act or threatened act that results in any 
physical . . . injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical, 
mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.”29 It then enumerates 
injuries that can harm a child’s health or welfare. The enumerated injuries 
range from willfully inflicted “sprains, dislocations, or cartilage damage” to 
“intracranial hemorrhage or injury to other internal organs.”30 
Definitions with a greater degree of specificity provide additional guidance 
to CPS workers and judges who are charged with determining whether a given 
act or injury constitutes physical abuse. In some cases, the act or injury may fall 
precisely within one of the enumerated classes. In others, decisionmakers may 
be able to compare the suspicious act or injury to one of the enumerated classes 
to determine if it is sufficiently similar.31 Statutes containing enumerated lists 
typically specify that the lists are illustrative and not exclusive, thereby 
reserving for decisionmakers a certain measure of discretion.32 
Finally, a few states use both the abuse and neglect classifications for 
unlawful physical injuries to a child, sorting cases between these classifications 
not according to the act or omission causing the injury, but rather according to 
the relative degree of severity of the injury itself. For example, New York 
explicitly includes “excessive corporal punishment” within its statutory-neglect 
definition.33 Thus, it defines an abused child as one who suffers “physical injury 
by other than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of 
death, or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of 
physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
 
 26. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(vi) (2009). 
 27. Id. at §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(VII) (2009). See supra note 21 and accompanying text (setting this 
clause in context and noting its outright prohibition of strikes to the face or interference with the 
breathing of a child). 
 28. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-103(2)(A)(vii)(a)–(d) (2009). 
 29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). 
 30. Id. at §§ 39.01(31)(a), 30.01(31)(d). Illinois defines physical abuse as the infliction of 
nonaccidental physical injury that causes “death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional 
health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.” 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3(a) (West 2001 & 
Supp. 2007). 
 31. E.g., Stella M. v. Daniel T.-W., 1997 WL 634580, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1997) (failing to 
find abuse because “red marks on a child’s buttocks are [not] in the same category as burns and severe 
or frequent bruising” when “physical injury” was defined to include lacerations, fractured bones, burns, 
internal injuries, severe or frequent bruising, or great bodily harm). 
 32. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(31)(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (explaining that the list of 
injuries to follow is not all-inclusive). 
 33. § 371(4-a)(i)(B). 
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bodily organ.”34 And it classifies as neglected a child whose physical condition 
has been impaired or harmed, but not injured seriously enough to create a 
substantial risk of death or protracted disfigurement or impairment.35 Other 
states adopting this approach have done so either informally or by 
administrative regulation. For example, North Carolina’s CPS agencies employ 
a decision tree that requires classifying as neglect by inappropriate discipline 
any instance of corporal punishment that transgresses the agencies’ 
reasonableness criteria but that does not meet its abuse standards.36 
2. Statutory Allowances for Reasonable Corporal Punishment 
Statutory definitions of physical abuse appearing in state family- or juvenile-
court codes commonly except reasonable measures of physical discipline 
administered by parents.37 This exception reflects the longstanding common-law 
privilege of discipline, which provides that “[a] parent is privileged to apply 
such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his child 
as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or 
education.”38 
 
 34. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4-b)(i) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 35. § 371(4-a)(i). 
 36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101(15) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (defining neglect to include 
inappropriate discipline); see also § 7B-101(11a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (defining the family-
assessment response). In January 2006, all North Carolina counties adopted a version of the Multiple 
Response System, which separately provides that CPS must track less-severe instances of inappropriate 
discipline or unreasonable corporal punishment onto a nonadversarial “family assessment” track. This 
move reinforces North Carolina’s commitment to distinguishing instances of corporal punishment that 
are properly classified as abuse (and tracked accordingly, onto the adversarial-investigative track) from 
those that are to be classified as neglect. Several other states have a version of the MRS, including 
Missouri, Michigan, and Washington, see http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=17800, but their 
neglect definitions do not explicitly include inappropriate discipline. In Michigan, for example, CPS 
workers can classify cases into five categories, depending on the sufficiency of the evidence and risk 
level. Michigan Dep’t of Human Serv, Children’s Protective Services Investigation Process, http:// 
www.michigan.gov/dhs/0,1607,7-124-5452_7119_7194-159484--,00.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). If 
evidence indicating low-risk abuse or neglect is sufficient, CPS officials can require community-based 
services without listing the perpetrator in an abuse or neglect registry. Even if the evidence is 
insufficient, CPS officials can still offer services on a voluntary basis. 
 37. Even in states that lack physical-discipline exceptions within their family or juvenile-court 
codes, courts have recognized a parent’s physical-discipline privilege based on a statutory privilege 
found in the criminal code or a common-law privilege. For example, the Connecticut Court of Appeals 
recognized that a criminal statute granting parents a privilege to use reasonable physical force to 
correct their child “demonstrate[d] the public recognition of the parental right to punish children for 
their own welfare” and thus expressed the “state’s policy of allowing reasonable corporal punishment.” 
Lovan C. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 860 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). Likewise, 
despite Iowa’s lack of a statutory exception for reasonable physical discipline, the state’s Supreme 
Court recognized that “[t]he law clearly gives parents who are so inclined the right to inflict reasonable 
corporal punishment in connection with the rearing of their children.” In re W.G., 349 N.W.2d 487, 487 
(Iowa 1984). In sum, parents in all states may physically discipline their children provided that such 
discipline does not cross the line to become physical abuse. 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (2001). 
State common law is law as it has evolved and continues to evolve in the state courts. For examples of 
judicial decisions reflecting the traditional common-law corporal-punishment privilege, see State v. 
Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980, 984 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A] parent has a privilege to use moderate or 
COLEMAN, DODGE, & CAMPBELL 10/25/2010  12:50:15 PM 
118 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:107 
Twenty-one states, along with the District of Columbia, except reasonable 
physical discipline from their statutory definitions of physical abuse. These 
provisions typically use the term “reasonable” to describe legally acceptable 
corporal punishment, although some employ the term “excessive” to describe 
corporal punishment that has crossed the line of acceptability.39 For example, 
the District of Columbia’s statute provides that abuse “does not include 
discipline administered by a parent, guardian, or custodian to his or her child; 
provided, that the discipline is reasonable in manner and moderate in degree 
and otherwise does not constitute cruelty.”40 The statute then provides an 
illustrative list of specific acts that are unacceptable forms of discipline for 
purposes of the exception. Among these acts are “burning, biting, or cutting a 
child” and “nonaccidental injury to a child under the age of 18 months.”41 
Similarly, in Florida, physical discipline can be considered excessive when it 
results in “significant bruises or welts,” among other enumerated injuries.42 
Finally, in addition to requiring that discipline be reasonable in nature and 
degree, several states’ statutes formally require decisionmakers to evaluate as a 
threshold matter whether the injury or incident was disciplinary in nature; the 
consequences flowing from that evaluation differ, depending on the 
jurisdiction.43 The most common of these provisions expressly codifies the two-
pronged, common-law standard requiring parents seeking refuge under the 
privilege or exception to prove, first, that discipline was reasonably necessary or 
appropriate under the circumstances and, second, that the nature and degree of 
force used itself was reasonable. For example, Hawaii’s statute provides that 
[t]he use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable [when] . . . (a) 
[t]he force is employed with due regard for the age and size of the minor and is 
reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the 
minor, including the prevention or punishment of the minor’s misconduct; and (b) 
[t]he force used is not designed to cause or known to create a risk of causing 
 
reasonable physical force, without criminal liability, when engaged in the discipline of his or her child . . 
. [but] [t]he physical force cannot be cruel or excessive if it is to be justified.”); Anderson v. State, 487 
A.2d 294, 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (“As a defense . . . to what would otherwise be an assault and 
battery, an individual in loco parentis may sometimes, but not always, establish that the force used upon 
the child was privileged as necessary and proper to the exercise of domestic authority.”). 
 39. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia provide that reasonable physical discipline is not 
abuse. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 16, at 5. The fourteen states are Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Washington. Id. In addition to these explicit exceptions for reasonable physical discipline, seven 
other states implicitly exclude reasonable physical discipline by providing that excessive corporal 
punishment is abuse: Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. 
 40. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(23)(B)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
 41. §§ 16-2301(23)(B)(1)(I), 16-2301(23)(B)(1)(IV). 
 42. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(4)(k) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). 
 43. The requirement of a disciplinary motive is inherent in the allowance, see infra notes 44–46 and 
129–145 and accompanying text; the text of most exceptions and an apparent deference to parents’ 
sense of the circumstances leads decisionmakers generally to focus only on the reasonableness of the 
nature and degree of force used. 
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substantial bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or 
neurological damage.44 
At least one state, Ohio, appears to provide parents with statutory authority 
to cause a child more harm in disciplinary contexts than in nondisciplinary 
contexts; its corporal-punishment exception provides that physical discipline 
that is “excessive under the circumstances and creates a substantial risk of 
serious physical harm to the child”45 constitutes abuse, whereas acts other than 
physical discipline constitute abuse whenever they “harm the child’s health or 
welfare.”46 
B. Child Protective Services 
Although state legislatures are responsible for defining maltreatment in the 
first instance, the law on the ground is mostly set by the CPS professionals 
charged with investigating and supervising the investigation of maltreatment 
reports.47 Specifically, CPS professionals are responsible for determining 
whether particular factual situations described in the reports qualify as abuse or 
neglect, or are appropriately classified as reasonable corporal punishment.48 The 
vagueness inherent in most statutory definitions—including specifically in 
disciplinary exemptions that, without more, permit “reasonable” and disallow 
“excessive” corporal punishment—assures that, absent additional constraints, 
individual CPS professionals and departments have quite a lot of discretion as 
to the methodology they use to do this triage and as to where they ultimately 
draw the line between reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment. Even 
when CPS decisionmaking is administratively constrained, however, personal 
and community ideology continues to play a considerable role in this process. 
1.The Factors that Influence CPS Decisionmaking 
Consistent with prevailing statutory language, when evaluating whether an 
act of corporal punishment was reasonable or abusive, CPS most typically 
 
 44. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703-309 (1) (West 2009). Other states have similar statutes. E.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §468(1) (2009) (Delaware); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.061(1) (West 2009) (Missouri); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(2)(ii) (2006) (South Carolina). 
 45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(B)(3) (West 2006). Section 2919 is part of Ohio’s penal code. 
It is included here because the definition of physical abuse for purposes of juvenile-court jurisdiction 
defines an abused child as one endangered as defined in section 2919.22. See § 2151.031(B). 
 46. § 2151.031(D). Thus, physical discipline must seriously harm the child—not just harm the 
child—before it rises to the level of abuse. “Serious physical harm” is defined in the statute to include 
physical harm involving the following: a substantial risk of death, some permanent or temporary 
substantial incapacity, permanent or temporary substantial disfigurement, or acute pain. § 
2901.01(5)(a)–(e). 
 47. This law is effectively dispositive because CPS decisions in individual cases mostly go 
uncontested. See GIOVANNONI & BECERRA, supra note 6, at 59 (explaining that “appellate cases in 
neglect matters have been unusually rare” and that this can be attributed to “the lack of sophistication 
and financial resources of the majority of parents affected”). 
 48. DORNE, supra note 16, at 153–54. 
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considers the nature and degree of the immediate physical harm to the child.49 
The extent to which that injury may have long-term or even permanent physical 
consequences will generally affect the CPS determination, particularly in those 
jurisdictions that require a serious or severe injury either statutorily or by 
custom. Depending on the jurisdiction and the individual decisionmaker, 
however, such consequences may not be required; indeed, a common CPS 
practice holds that a bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours is sufficient 
to meet the maltreatment standard.50 Relatedly, to the extent that an immediate 
but not serious or severe physical injury implicates a risk of more-serious harm 
in the future, CPS may choose to denominate that original injury abuse. In fact, 
for some CPS agents and departments, risk is one of the most important 
criteria.51 
 
 49. All interviewees remain anonymous, at their request. Telephone interview by Erin Vernon, 
Duke University School of Law, with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 26, 2009) 
(on file with Law and Contemporary Problems, hereinafter, L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L 
& CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 
25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, 
Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas 
County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on 
file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. 
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 50. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, When Inflicted 
Skin Injuries Constitute Child Abuse, 110 PEDIATRICS 644, 644 (2002), available at http:// 
aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;110/3/644.pdf (“One practical criterion often used is 
that any inflicted injury that lasts more than twenty-four hours constitutes significant injury (i.e., 
physical abuse).”) (citing IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, EMPLOYEES’ MANUAL (1997), 
available at http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Publications/PM1810.pdf (listing “[r]eddening of surface 
tissue lasting more than 24 hours” as a “[p]hysical sign of possible child abuse”)). The relevance of a 
bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours varies across jurisdictions and agencies and there may 
even be an equivocal standard within a single agency. For instance, in one county in North Carolina, 
bruises lasting for longer than twenty-four hours were described as both sufficient and insufficient on 
their own to justify a finding of maltreatment. See interview by Kenneth Dodge and Doriane Coleman 
with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (February 13, 2009) (on file with L & CP). In 
Nebraska, the existence of a bruise for more than twenty-four hours is enough to ensure an 
investigation but is not enough on its own to result in an abuse or neglect finding. See telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. 
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP). Moreover, in Oregon, a bruise lasting more than twenty-four 
hours prioritizes the investigation, but in some cases a bruise that lasts less than twenty-four hours may 
be enough to substantiate abuse. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 51. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (listing risk as the second most 
important factor); see telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, 
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Other common criteria include chronicity, or the frequency with which a 
particular child is subject to corporal punishment,52 the location of the injury on 
the child’s body,53 the child’s age54 and special-needs status,55 whether an object 
was used,56 and the immediate or long-term emotional and developmental 
 
Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (most important factor in safety analysis); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas 
County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS 
supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 26, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 52. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 
17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, 
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and 
Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP). 
 53. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); see 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with County CPS Director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with county CPS supervisor, Adams 
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. 
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 54. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by 
Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, 
Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon 
with county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by 
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, 
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 55. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas 
County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a 
county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 56. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by 
Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 
17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, 
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ramifications of the physical harm.57 Like risk, these criteria can contribute to a 
finding of abuse even in cases in which the immediate physical injury, standing 
alone, is relatively moderate and thus would otherwise be classified as 
reasonable.58 For example, evidence of chronicity, the use of an object such as a 
belt or a switch, the child’s fear of the parent or anxiety about the safety of the 
home, or an injury in a location other than the buttocks (harm to the head or 
neck is particularly provocative in this regard) may cause CPS to classify as 
abuse a bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours, even if that same agency 
would normally decline to intervene based on the injury alone.59 
Finally, in the evaluation of individual incidents and injuries, CPS may 
consider parents’ rights and family privacy, including parents’ motivation for 
using corporal punishment and parents’ ethnic or cultural background. Parents’ 
rights and family privacy may be considered as essential factors to be balanced 
against harm to the child or as relatively insignificant in light of the agency’s 
mandate to focus on child welfare.60 Parents’ motivation is more or less relevant 
 
Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on 
file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. 
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 57. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. 
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & 
CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 
25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with 
a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. 
Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 
16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 58. See, e.g., telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 59. See, e.g., interview by Kenneth Dodge and Doriane Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, 
Durham County, N.C. (February 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 60. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams 
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by 
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, 
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
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to agencies or social workers depending on the extent to which they believe the 
inquiry should focus entirely on medical harm to the child; when motivation 
matters in the analysis, parents may be permitted to cause more harm than they 
would when it is not a consideration.61 Relatedly, CPS professionals may 
consider the family’s ethnic or cultural background, as in assessing whether a 
particular form of corporal punishment is normative in the family’s 
community.62 As with parental motivation, however, those who focus primarily 
on medical harm to the child will tend to discount or ignore diversity of 
parenting practices.63 
2. Exercising and Constraining Discretion 
The factors that a particular CPS social worker or agency considers in 
drawing the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse, and the 
weight the factors are given, depend on two circumstances: the extent to which 
the agency or social worker is administratively (by regulation, policy, or 
protocol) constrained and the decisionmaker’s own community norms, 
disciplinary training, and personal ideology. The more elaborate the 
administrative constraints, the less likely it is that divergent norms, training, and 
ideology will influence the decision. However, because it is impossible to 
eliminate entirely the need for CPS to exercise discretion—at the margins, the 
line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse is “uncertain and 
wavering” at best64—norms, training, and ideology play a role even within 
 
 61. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 62. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 63. See, e.g., interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 64. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L 
& CP). The phrase “uncertain and wavering line” comes from Justice William S. Andrews’ famous 
dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928), in which he describes the 
trouble judges have deciding whether a defendant was a proximate cause of an accident. He explains 
that this decision sometimes involves imprecise line-drawing because 
[t]here are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. There are simply matters of which we can 
take account . . . . Many things contribute to the spread of the conflagration—the force of 
the wind, the direction and width of the streets, the character of intervening structures, 
other factors. We draw an uncertain and wavering line, but draw it we must as best we can. 
Id. The decision where to draw the line between reasonable corporal punishment and maltreatment has 
been described similarly. See, e.g., interview by Kenneth Dodge and Doriane Coleman with a CPS 
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (expressing disagreement with the 
idea that a continuum spans reasonable corporal punishment and abuse because this suggests, 
erroneously, that there is a single place where professionals draw the line; explaining that a complicated 
set of factors must be considered instead and that even using these factors, “rough cuts” still need to be 
made in certain cases; and noting that these involve subjectivity and common sense on the part of the 
professionals involved). 
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tightly constrained programs. This gap between statutory requirements and “on 
the street” practice is well known in political science and public-policy analysis 
more generally.65 
CPS agencies and social workers across the country vary in the extent to 
which they are administratively constrained as they evaluate individual cases of 
alleged abuse. Until recently, CPS decisionmaking was relatively unconstrained, 
resulting in a landscape where social workers’ personal orientations influenced 
results.66 In jurisdictions following this approach, a social worker or agency 
holding particularly strong views (one way or the other) on the moral or 
religious foundations for corporal punishment or on the relevance of any 
emotional or developmental impacts, might render decisions about the 
reasonableness of individual instances of corporal punishment (at least in part) 
according to those views. The current trend is to the contrary: jurisdictions at 
either the state or the county level tend to adopt elaborate regulatory schemes 
designed to standardize, to the extent possible, the decisionmaking process and 
the scenarios that will and will not constitute unlawful corporal punishment.67 
Some administrative protocols for substantiating maltreatment include only 
immediate physical factors such as the age and size of the child and the severity, 
duration, and location of the mark.68 Protocols may also take into consideration 
other observable or quantifiable factors like the object used, the number of hits 
or strikes, and the chronicity, but may exclude most or all emotional and 
developmental factors.69 Increasingly common among these new regulatory 
 
 65. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980). 
 66. See Wald, supra note 3, at 1001 (“Because the statutes do not reflect a considered analysis of 
what types of harm justify the risks of intervention, decisionmaking is left to the ad hoc analysis of 
social workers and judges.”); supra notes 2–3 (describing this phenomenon). Cf. GIOVANNONI & 
BECERRA, supra note 6, at 11 (“There is strong evidence that these professionals feel this burden [of 
interpretation] keenly and are extremely dissatisfied with the ambiguous criteria under which they must 
operate.”). Research in the social sciences also supports the influence of personal and professional 
orientations on social workers’ maltreatment classifications. See Vicki Ashton, The Effect of Personal 
Characteristics on Reporting Child Maltreatment, 28 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 985, 986 (2004). 
 67. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & 
CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, 
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 68. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. 
(June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS 
supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L 
& CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, 
Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); see telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS 
supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 69. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. 
(June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS 
supervisor, Adams County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (both Nebraska interviewees 
said they do not use the child’s emotional development in their maltreatment assessment); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with 
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schemes are those that focus most broadly on the physical, emotional, and 
developmental implications of the child’s injury70 and that involve a list of 
factors (differently weighted and sometimes integrated) that social workers 
must address in their investigations and evaluations.71 Unlike the approach that 
takes into consideration only immediate physical factors, this approach involves 
a more-complex analysis of whether a particular incident involves acceptable or 
unlawful corporal punishment; that is, in addition to considering the medical 
nature of the immediate physical injury, it places significant value on risk and 
on the nonphysical implications of physical injuries.72 
For example, North Carolina, which has a state-supervised, county-
administered CPS system, has established at the state level a decision tree that 
requires county CPS agencies and their social workers to evaluate not only the 
degree (severity) and nature of the physical injury at issue, but also factors such 
as the injury’s location on the body, whether an object was used, whether the 
injury is evidenced by a bruise lasting for more than twenty-four hours, the 
number of times the child was hit, the child’s developmental age, the family’s 
history with corporal punishment (chronicity) and with CPS, the child’s sense of 
safety in the home and with the offending parent, the injury’s emotional and 
developmental implications (including school-related implications), and the risk 
of future harm.73 Kansas’ Department of Child Protective Services’ investigation 
protocol similarly contains a fairly long list of factors including medical facts 
such as the severity and location of the injury as well as developmental 
implications, including a child’s ability to succeed in school and his or her 
emotional response, which must be considered during each investigation.74 
Notwithstanding these sometimes elaborate constraints, social workers 
continue to be influenced by considerations external to the protocols. These 
considerations may be in direct contravention of the protocols, or they may 
 
L & CP) (according to interviewee, Georgia does not consider a child’s ability to be successful at school 
as a factor in maltreatment investigations); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS 
frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by 
Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP) 
(both Oregon interviewees said they “sort of” considered a child’s emotional development, but 
emphasized they really consider that factor in neglect cases as opposed to physical maltreatment cases). 
 70. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. 
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 71. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 72. See id.; interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 73. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 74. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
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simply supplement formal assessment criteria as social workers exercise their 
remaining discretion. External considerations include factors that may be part 
of other protocols inapplicable to the threshold maltreatment assessment, 
community norms, and personal histories, training, and ideology. For example, 
when prompted with a list of factors and asked if each was considered during 
the investigation, CPS officials frequently responded in the affirmative, despite 
a factor’s absence from the official protocol.75 A Kansas frontline investigator 
explicitly stated that she considered temporary parental stress, even though it is 
not a factor in the policy manual. She went on to explain that she tries to take in 
every possible consideration.76 Additionally, interviews conducted with eleven 
CPS officials in five states suggest that regardless of each state’s particular 
protocols and regulations, risk of future harm is a significant factor in evaluating 
whether a particular instance of corporal punishment is reasonable.77 Some CPS 
officials acknowledge that they are taking factors pertinent to the post-
substantiation safety assessment into account as they evaluate the threshold 
question of maltreatment, in part because conducting assessments concurrently 
is more efficient. 78 These additional factors include the parent’s level of control 
in the situation, any temporary stressors present in the home, how the current 
situation affects future situations, and the risk of future incidents.79 
Community culture and norms also influence even those social workers 
whose decisions are constrained by formal factors, protocols, or decision trees. 
For example, community attitudes toward corporal punishment often affect the 
criminal investigation, and if criminal charges are not filed, social workers must 
 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id.; telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, 
Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS 
frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 77. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams 
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon, with a 
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). Risk is considered relevant to the 
determination of maltreatment not only because abuse is expressly defined to include both harm and a 
risk of harm, but also because, as a practical matter, a finding of significant risk permits CPS to 
intervene in the family to protect the child from future harm. 
 78. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. 
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 79. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams County, Neb. 
(June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, 
Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
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consider how such attitudes may weaken their civil maltreatment case.80 One 
social worker in Oregon, who has worked in both a rural county and an urban 
county, is particularly sensitive to community ideology and its subsequent effect 
on judicial decisions.81 She found that judges in urban communities are much 
less lenient toward parents’ use of corporal punishment compared with judges 
in rural communities. She attributed this to the election of judges based on the 
electorate’s ideological views and to judges’ subsequent preoccupation with 
reelection. Although formally she considers the same factors whether 
investigating in a rural or urban community, she does consider how specific 
factors and evidence will be viewed by a particular court or judge.82 Removing a 
child may not be helpful if a judge will ultimately return the child to the parent. 
Consequently, social workers consider what a particular judge will do, and that 
consideration may change how they proceed with the family.83 
Finally, personal histories, training, and ideology may continue to influence 
social workers’ exercise of discretion, regardless of the nature of the 
administrative constraints under which they are placed. For example, all of the 
CPS officials interviewed emphasized the importance their jurisdiction’s 
substantiation protocols place on the child’s sense of safety in the home, but 
several cautioned that this criterion requires a thorough evaluation of why the 
child is afraid.84 In exercising the discretion required for this evaluation, one 
frontline investigator in Kansas explained her feeling that a child’s fear of a 
parent is an important factor that should be taken seriously.85 In contrast, some 
investigators think the fear of being punished is insufficient.86 One North 
 
 80. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas 
County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams 
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by 
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, 
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 85. See telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline investigator, Johnson 
County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 86. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
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Carolina CPS supervisor in a rural county hesitated to consider fear a good 
indicator of abuse.87 She explained by describing her experience with corporal 
punishment growing up: “When I was a child and my daddy said I was going to 
get beat when I got home, I was certainly scared and fearful of going home, but 
this is not abuse.”88 A particularly provocative example of the relevance of 
personal and professional perspectives involves social workers’ views of the 
relevance of family privacy and parents’ rights to the maltreatment 
determination. Specifically, although all interviewees acknowledged CPS’s 
responsibility to respect family privacy, including parents’ right to use corporal 
punishment to discipline their children, they also explained their view that their 
job is to protect children from harm, not to protect parents’ privacy rights. They 
further explained that this obligation encompasses both children’s physical 
welfare and their emotional and developmental well-being, and that well-being 
should be understood, on the basis of social science evidence, to be relevant to 
proving unlawful discipline.89 Implicit in their perspective is the view that the 
child’s and parents’ interests are not obviously coterminous and that family 
privacy and parental rights are not necessarily good for children. 
 
 87. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 88. Id. The relevance of parental motivation appears similarly to be influenced by social workers’ 
personal perspectives. For example, in one North Carolina county, the CPS supervisor believed 
parental motivation did not matter when investigating an incident, whereas the frontline worker in the 
same county thought it was significant. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L 
& CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, 
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). In contrast, in a county in Oregon, the 
director thought parental motivation was a “very important” factor while the frontline investigator 
placed far less importance upon that particular factor. See interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on 
file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
supervisor, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). Social workers in rural 
counties are often personally familiar with the families in the community and thus may have 
preconceived notions about a particular family which can affect how the investigation proceeds. See 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, 
Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS 
frontline investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 89. See interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Duplin County, N.C. (June 
26, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS frontline 
investigator, Johnson County, Kan. (June 18, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin 
Vernon with a county CPS director, Fulton County, Ga. (June 25, 2009) (on file with L & CP); 
telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS director, Adams County, Neb. (June 16, 2009) 
(on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Adams 
County, Neb. (June 17, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone interview by Erin Vernon with a 
county CPS frontline investigator, Dallas County, Or. (June 23, 2009) (on file with L & CP); telephone 
interview by Erin Vernon with a county CPS supervisor, Dallas County, Or. (June 22, 2009) (on file 
with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS 
frontline investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by 
Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, Durham County, 
N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP); interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman with a county CPS director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
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C. Courts 
Courts act as a check on CPS decisions to intervene in the family. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, trial courts may be specially denominated 
family, juvenile, or dependency courts. They approve (or not) CPS decisions to 
declare children in need of protection, either temporarily, during the pendency 
of an investigation, or for a longer term, following substantiation of 
maltreatment. Trial-court involvement in the CPS process is routine, thus 
establishing trial-court judges as critical players of the law as it is practiced on 
the ground. Appellate courts have authority to review trial-court decisions. 
However, very few trial-court decisions are appealed by either party. Not many 
parents have the will or the resources to appeal adverse decisions.90 And CPS 
agencies may face political and procedural hurdles that make appeals difficult 
for them too.91 As a result, although appellate courts are formally superior 
institutions and responsible for making common law, they are less relevant on a 
day-to-day basis than trial courts. 
Although trial courts may be more likely than appellate courts to render 
decisions favorable to CPS because of their ongoing working relationship with 
its professionals, both trial and appellate courts retain wide discretion in 
determining whether an act of physical discipline constitutes unlawful physical 
abuse. This discretion is attributable both to the broad and imprecise language 
found in most statutory definitions of physical abuse and to the fact that judges 
are free either to be guided by92 or to disregard unreasonable agency 
interpretations of that language.93 Ultimately, because of this broad discretion, 
but also probably because of their different disciplinary orientation, judges have 
developed their own approaches to drawing the line between reasonable 
physical discipline and unlawful physical abuse. These approaches vary from 
state to state and judge to judge. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the relevant 
cases shows that, in general, courts consider many of the same factors as CPS 
does, including the degree and severity of the child’s injury, the child’s real and 
developmental age, the manner of discipline, and whether a pattern of abuse 
(chronicity) is present. Importantly, though, this analysis also demonstrates that 
courts are more likely than CPS to consider parent-focused factors, such as the 
 
 90. See supra note 47. 
 91. Because CPS professionals often have long-term working relationships with the particular trial-
court judges assigned to review their maltreatment decisions, accommodations may be made on both 
sides, but especially by CPS. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. CPS may also be inhibited 
by states’ sometimes-stingy procedural requirements for appeals. 
 92. See, e.g., In re interest of J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“We are guided by the 
Illinois Administrative Rules . . . [which suggest] considering such factors as the child’s age, the severity 
of the injury, the location of the injury, whether an instrument was used, and the pattern and chronicity 
of similar incidents of harm to the child.”). 
 93. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 77 (2007); see also Sokol v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. 
Serv., 981 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Kan. 1999) (“[I]n reviewing questions of law, the trial court may substitute 
its judgment for that of the administrative agency, although ordinarily the court will give great 
deference to the interpretation of statutes and regulations of the enforcing agency.”). 
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parent’s right to use physical discipline and the parent’s motivation for doing so 
in a particular case, and less likely than CPS to consider an injury’s emotional 
and developmental sequelae. Indeed, depending on the jurisdiction, these 
parent-focused factors may predominate. 
1. Factors Common to Judicial and CPS Decisionmaking 
a. Severity of injury. Consistent with state statutes that typically define 
physical abuse in terms of harm or injury to the child, courts drawing the line 
between reasonable corporal punishment and unlawful physical abuse focus 
heavily on the degree and severity of the child’s physical injury. The level of 
harm or injury necessary for an act of physical discipline to constitute abuse 
depends largely on each state’s statutory definition of abuse. Courts commonly 
consider such factors as whether medical treatment was required, how much 
pain the child experienced, and whether the injury resulted in disfigurement or 
impairment.94 Courts are reluctant to find that bruising alone is severe enough 
to constitute physical abuse.95 In fact, some courts have specifically rejected CPS 
rules and regulations that permit a finding of abuse when a child experiences a 
bruise lasting more than twenty-four hours.96 In general, courts appear more 
willing to find physical abuse when punishment results in multiple or very large 
bruises, bruises with a deep or intense color, bruises lasting a week or more, 
bruises that are especially painful, or bruises on a location other than the child’s 
buttocks.97 At least some courts demand more before they are willing to find 
 
 94. See, e.g., T.G. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 927 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that evidence was insufficient to establish abuse when physical discipline resulted in bruising 
but the agency failed to produce evidence that the bruises required medical attention); In re Miles, 2002 
WL 1065704, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 22, 2002) (per curiam) (holding that evidence was insufficient 
to establish abuse when a mother’s fiancé bit her nine-year-old child because there was no evidence 
“that acute pain resulted of any lasting duration to result in substantial suffering, or that [the pain] 
lasted for an extended period of time or was intractable”). But see In re F.S., 806 N.E.2d 1087, 1094–95 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (explaining that there is no requirement that injuries necessitate medical treatment 
in order to constitute abuse). 
 95. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Caldwell, 832 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) 
(explaining that evidence of bruising as a single factor “standing alone and applied as a litmus test, 
without consideration of all the attendant circumstances, is [not] an appropriate measure to be used in 
all cases for determining whether an allegation of abuse is to be sustained”). 
 96. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected a CPS rule that reddening of the skin lasting for 
twenty-four hours or more is a physical injury per se. Hildreth v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Serv., 550 
N.W.2d 157, 158–60 (Iowa 1996) (explaining that “welts, bruises, or similar markings are not physical 
injuries per se but may be and frequently are evidence from which the existence of physical injury can 
be found”). Florida courts have also rejected an agency policy requiring investigators to confirm reports 
of abuse when bruises are visible twenty-four hours after the discipline is administered. B.R. v. Dep’t of 
Health and Rehab. Serv., 558 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also, e.g., In re O.C., 934 
So. 2d 623, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a four-inch bruise on a child’s buttocks was 
insufficient to support a finding of physical abuse and noting that “case law has established . . . that a 
single incident of a serious bruise on the buttock of a child, perhaps caused by corporal punishment, 
will not support a finding of dependency” and that “some evidence of a pattern of excessive corporal 
punishment or a single punishment resulting in a more serious injury is required”). 
 97. Compare Cobble v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Social Serv., 719 N.E.2d 500, 503, 508 (Mass. 1999) 
(finding evidence insufficient to establish abuse when a father disciplined his son by striking him on the 
buttocks with a belt resulting in temporary red marks that lasted approximately ten minutes), with In re 
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that the requisite “serious” injury has occurred. For example, the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals held that bruises on a child’s arm and upper 
buttocks lasting for several days were insufficient to establish that the child, 
who had been beaten with a belt, was abused. The court explained that abuse 
involves “an injury more severe than a bruise as a result of a spanking.”98 And it 
provided as examples of incidents and injuries that did pass muster: choking, 
hitting with fists and glass objects, pulling out hair, and burning.99 
b. The age and developmental stage of the child. The cases suggest that courts 
are more inclined to classify a disciplinary measure as abuse when the act is 
administered against a young child or one with physical or mental disabilities.100 
The courts’ consideration of these characteristics can be explained in two ways. 
First, a spanking administered against a young child or a child with physical 
disabilities may cause a more-serious physical injury and more-serious long-
term consequences to emotional development than the same spanking 
administered against an older or physically healthy child.101 In this sense, the age 
and condition of a child is simply part of a court’s consideration of the degree 
and severity of the child’s injury. Second, a young child or a child with a mental 
or emotional disability may lack the capacity to understand the purpose of the 
discipline or appreciate its deterrent effect.102 A spanking that has no 
disciplinary value because the child lacks the capacity to understand its purpose 
is more likely to be unreasonable or excessive. 
c. Manner of discipline. Courts often consider how much force and how 
many strikes parents employ when they administer physical discipline, as well as 
 
L.T.R., 639 S.E.2d 122, 126 (finding physical abuse when stepfather hit his four-year-old stepson with a 
brush causing a “dark, six-inch bruise, which lasted well over one week, on his right thigh” which 
caused visible discomfort several days later), and J.S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 565 A.2d 862, 864 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1989) (finding abuse of a five-year-old child when spanking caused “black and blue marks 
over her entire buttocks area causing severe pain”), and S.C. Dep’t of Social Serv. v. Father and 
Mother, 366 S.E.2d 40, 41 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (finding abuse when a thirteen-year-old child sustained 
“purple bruises covering almost the entire back of her left thigh and a part of the back of her right leg, 
extending to her knee”). 
 98. In re C.B., J.B., Th.B., & Ti.B., 636 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
 99. Id. 
 100. This inclination is consistent with recent moves in some jurisdictions to classify all physical 
discipline of children under a certain age as per se unreasonable. In 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court 
prohibited corporal punishment for children under the age of two or over the age of twelve. Canandian 
Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4 (Can.). 
Additionally, a California legislator sponsored a bill that would have made spanking a child under the 
age of three a misdemeanor but abandoned it due to a lack of political support. Jesse McKinley, 
Lawmaker Ends Effort to Make Spanking a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at A15. 
 101. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 1989 WL 98423, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1989) (emphasizing that 
paddling with a board could “create pain that would be unbearable or nearly so to a two-year-old 
child”). 
 102. See Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. v. R.C., 2007 S.W.3d WL 416776, at *7 (Ark. Feb. 8, 
2007) (finding abuse when a four-year-old child suffering from cerebral palsy received a spanking 
causing eight to ten bruises); Lovan C. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 860 A.2d 1283, 1290 (Conn. 
Ct. App. 2004) (relevant factors include “the amount of force used and the child’s age, size and ability 
to understand the punishment”). 
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whether they use an object such as a belt or paddle.103 The cases suggest that 
courts view with more suspicion a parent who uses extreme force to strike a 
child repeatedly with a paddle or belt than one who swats a child a couple of 
times with an open hand; correspondingly, such discipline is more likely to be 
found to exceed the bounds of reasonableness.104 To some extent, these factors 
simply correspond to the degree or severity of harm inflicted on the child. As 
one court pointed out, an object may create a barrier between the parent and 
child and prevent the parent from realizing how hard he is striking the child.105 
Uncontrolled, forceful striking or the use of an object to strike a child also 
might increase the risk of severe injury if the child squirms or otherwise moves 
as the discipline is being administered.106 Interestingly, there is some evidence 
that parents choose to discipline with an object instead of a hand because they 
believe doing so is less harmful to the child. For example, a parent may choose 
to use a spoon or another object to administer a spanking because doing so 
makes it less likely that their children will perceive hitting with hands as an 
acceptable way to solve problems.107 Some courts also infer something about the 
parent’s motive or intent from the parent’s choice of disciplinary method. 
Whereas courts may view injuries resulting from a measured, restrained 
spanking as just the “regrettable result” of well-intentioned corporal 
punishment, more-extreme methods of punishment are viewed suspiciously 
because they suggest that a parent actually intends to injure his child.108 
 
 103. See, e.g., In re Mercer, 2005 WL 914671, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2005) (considering the 
“[n]ature of manner of the discipline administered, and the measure of discipline”). 
 104. See In re F.W., 634 N.E.2d 1123, 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (urging parents to “understand that a 
swat on a child’s buttocks with an open hand and the ‘paddling’ of a child with belts, cords, or ropes are 
intrinsically distinct exercises of corporal punishment” and warning that “parents using boards, belts, 
cords, or ropes as weapons to inflict corporal punishment may encounter an unwillingness on the part 
of DCFS and the courts to regard their conduct as reasonable”). But see In re J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 346 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“[T]he use of an object, especially when the court finds that the object was not 
‘terribly offensive’ or ‘heinous’ should not blind a court to the many other factors which should and 
must be considered when weighing the evidence.”). 
 105. Hildreth v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Serv., 550 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1996) (“The laws of physics 
are such that when even a moderate degree of force is administered through an instrument that makes 
contact with only a small area of the body, the pressure visited upon that point may be more than will 
reasonably be anticipated.”). 
 106. See City of Philadelphia v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 767 A.2d 10, 11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (A 
mother bruised her son’s forearm and back with a pool stick when he tried to shield himself from her 
strikes to the buttocks). 
 107. One mother told a child-services caseworker that she used a wooden spoon to discipline her 
child because she believed it was wrong to hit with the hand, which should represent love. In re J.P., 692 
N.E.2d 338, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). Another parent explained that he preferred to use an object 
instead of his hand because he did not want to teach his children that “the way to solve things is by 
hitting with the hand.” In re B.B., 598 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). 
 108. See, e.g., P.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 801 A.2d 478, 487 (Pa. 2002) (holding that an agency 
must show that a parent’s conduct in administering corporal punishment was a “gross deviation from 
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the same situation” to establish that 
injuries inflicted as a result of corporal punishment constitute abuse; the court found that the decision 
to use a belt with a buckle was not such a gross deviation). In an earlier case, however, a Pennsylvania 
court held that a mother abused her daughter when she continued to strike her daughter with a belt as 
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d. Pattern of abuse or chronicity. Courts frequently consider whether an act 
of physical discipline is an isolated event or part of a larger pattern of arguably 
unreasonable discipline.109 If the individual injuries are relatively minor, a 
pattern, or chronicity, may cause them to be classified as abuse.110 Courts may 
place importance on a pattern of abuse because they fear that an escalation of 
violence in the future could put the child at risk. Though courts seem less likely 
than CPS workers explicitly to consider a child’s risk of future harm or injury, 
courts’ emphasis on the history of unreasonable physical discipline in the 
household indicates some concern for the child’s safety in the event that the 
child remains in the home. 
2. Nonphysical Sequelae and Parent-Focused Factors 
a. Emotional and developmental effects. Unlike CPS, which as an institution 
is increasingly incorporating the emotional and developmental effect of physical 
injuries into their assessment whether a particular incident of corporal 
punishment is abuse, courts appear rarely to consider the possibility that 
physical discipline may be emotionally or psychologically damaging to the child. 
A review of appellate-court decisions suggests that lower-court records contain 
little or no information about the emotional and developmental effects of 
physical discipline on the child.111 Even when these effects are recognized, 
however, courts are still likely to give them very little weight.112 One judge has 
 
her daughter ran up the stairs. B.J.K. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 773 A.2d 1271 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). 
See also In re Peter G., 6 A.D.3d 201, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (finding physical discipline reasonable 
absent a “showing that the father’s actions were extreme or unnecessarily degrading or prompted by 
rage or administered solely for self-gratification”). 
 109. See, e.g., In re O.C., 934 So. 2d 623, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (requiring either 
“evidence of a pattern of excessive punishment” or a more-serious single incident to constitute abuse). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Only a handful of the cases reviewed contained any references to emotional or developmental 
effects. See, e.g., In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979) (per curiam) (recounting testimony from a 
psychiatric social worker indicating that the home situation was causing major psychological problems 
for the child); In re T.F., 2005 WL 288996, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2005) (recounting testimony from 
a counselor indicating that “children appeared to be happy with the mother”); In re S.K., 564 A.2d 1382 
(D.C. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) (recounting expert testimony that the child’s mental illness was 
exacerbated by physical discipline); O.S. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 821 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002) (recounting evidence that child was self-mutilated). Illinois courts appear to consider 
the emotional and psychological effects more frequently than do courts in other states. See In re F.W., 
634 N.E.2d 1123, 1129 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that it is appropriate for the court to consider the 
“psychological effects of the discipline on the child”). It is impossible without doing a thorough search 
of case files to determine the information lower courts had at their disposal. These files are difficult to 
locate and, depending on the case, may be sealed. A review of appellate decisions is a good substitute 
for this search because they are based on evidence included in the record below. The experience of 
parties to and judges sitting on cases in the lower courts is consistent with our reading of these appellate 
decisions. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 112. In re BB, 598 N.W. 2d 312, 318 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (Sackett, C.J., concurring specially) 
(departing from the majority’s conclusion that excessive corporal punishment caused a child to adopt 
his parents’ aggressive approach to problem-solving because “this is not a conclusion to reach without 
any statistical evidence” and “experience ha[d] shown [the judge] that even young men who are not 
spanked at home fight at school”). 
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surmised that this bias is because judges in general lack the expertise to 
evaluate evidence related to the emotional or psychological impact of physical 
discipline on a child.113 Whatever the case, interviews with CPS professionals in 
one North Carolina county suggest that emotional- and developmental-impact 
evidence rarely makes it into the record notwithstanding its importance because 
neither the lawyers (for the state or the parents) nor the judges involved are 
interested in these facts; they simply want to know the circumstances in which 
the immediate physical injury occurred and the relevant medical details.114 
b. Parent’s motivation. Related to the circumstances in which the injury 
occurred, and in contrast with the practice of at least some CPS professionals, 
courts often consider a parent’s motivation for administering physical discipline 
when they evaluate the reasonableness of the disciplinary act. Specifically, some 
courts consider whether the disciplinary act was “rendered necessary” by the 
child’s actions.115 This approach requires courts to evaluate the nature and 
gravity of the child’s behavior and the parent’s attempts to address the behavior 
without resorting to physical discipline.116 The child’s age and developmental 
stage should also be relevant to this inquiry because punishment is pointless 
(and only potentially harmful) if the child is unable to appreciate its intended 
lesson. At bottom, the parental-motivation inquiry suggests that courts—unlike 
some CPS professionals—are not strictly focused on physical harm to the child. 
They are often willing to view physical discipline, even physical discipline that 
causes minor physical injury to the child, as reasonable, provided the parent’s 
 
 113. Cindy S. Lederman, Healing in the Place of Last Resort: The Role of the Dependency Court 
Within Community-Based Efforts to Prevent Child Maltreatment, in PREVENTING CHILD 
MALTREATMENT: COMMUNITY APPROACHES 172, 173 (Kenneth A. Dodge & Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman eds., 2009). 
 114. Interviews by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with county CPS frontline 
investigator and director, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP). 
 115. People ex rel. C.F., 708 N.W.2d 313, 317 (S.D. 2005). South Dakota employs a two-pronged 
analysis to determine whether an act of discipline is unlawful or reasonable. The first prong asks 
whether the “corrective measure utilized was ‘rendered necessary’ by the child’s actions,” while the 
second prong asks “whether the force used was ‘reasonable in manner and moderate in degree.’” Id. 
Connecticut and Ohio also appear to use a version of this two-pronged analysis. See Lovan C. v. Dep’t 
of Children and Families, 86 Conn. App. 290, 299 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (“In a substantiation of abuse 
hearing, if it is shown that a child has sustained a non-accidental injury as a result of parent 
administered corporal punishment, the hearing officer must determine whether the punishment was 
reasonable and whether the parent believed the punishment was necessary to maintain discipline or to 
promote the child’s welfare.”); In re Horton, 2004 WL 2674562, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2004) 
(determining whether a child is abused requires an inquiry into “(1) the excessiveness (or lack thereof) 
and necessity (or lack thereof) of the corporal punishment appellant inflicted, and (2) whether the 
punishment created a substantial risk of serious physical harm”). An opinion issued by the California 
Attorney General also suggested that this is the proper analysis. 80 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. No. 97-416 
(1997) (“[T]he punishment must be necessary and not excessive in relation to the individual 
circumstances.”). 
 116. See In re T.A., 663 N.W.2d 225, 230 (S.D. 2003) (finding physical discipline unnecessary 
because the boy’s “parents failed to intervene in any manner before resorting to spanking” and did not 
attempt alternative forms of discipline). 
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disciplinary act was a legitimate attempt to correct the child’s misbehavior.117 If 
the evidence suggests that a parent was instead acting viciously out of anger or 
cruelty, however, courts are not willing to afford parents the same discretion.118 
Many courts that do not explicitly evaluate the “necessity” of the disciplinary 
act still take into account the parent’s motivation by considering whether the 
parent employed physical discipline in a manner indicative of her desire to help, 
not harm, the child.119 Specifically, courts consider whether the parent-
administered discipline in a controlled manner, whether the parent was angry 
when he or she administered the discipline, and whether any evidence suggests 
a malicious intent.120 
c. Parent’s right to use physical discipline. Finally, when evaluating whether a 
finding of abuse is warranted, courts commonly refer to a parent’s right to 
administer reasonable physical discipline.121 The courts’ explicit recognition of 
this right as part of an attempt to draw the line between physical abuse and 
reasonable physical discipline suggests that—unlike some CPS agencies and 
professionals, who view their role primarily as saving children from their 
parents122—courts are focused either on simultaneously protecting children 
and preserving parents’ disciplinary autonomy, or, in some cases, primarily on 
the latter.123 
 
 117. See M.O. v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Serv., 575 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per 
curiam) (emphasizing that the discipline employed by parents was part of a therapeutic plan developed 
with the help of an outside expert). 
 118. See, e.g., In re Maurice S., 1994 WL 149549, at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1994) (finding abuse 
when father was angry at his son and “specifically ordered [him] to remove his sweater to ensure the 
punishments were painful” and when nothing suggested that the child was “defiant or otherwise 
uncontrollable or incorrigible”). 
 119. See, e.g., Raboin v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Serv., 552 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1996) (noting that 
parents only used corporal punishment as a last resort and in a structured manner); State ex rel. L.P., 
981 P.2d 848 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (considering whether parent’s action was a good faith effort to 
maintain discipline or, rather, a malicious intent to cause harm); Ables v. Rivero, 2003 WL 356446, at 
*6 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2003) (explaining that it is unreasonable to use physical discipline for the 
“exhibition of uncontrolled passion”). 
 120. See cases cited supra note 119. 
 121. See, e.g., In re J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 345 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998) (“It is clear that a parent has the 
‘right’ to corporally discipline his or her child, a right derived from our constitutional right to privacy. 
But this right, like any other, must be exercised in a ‘reasonable’ manner.”) (citations omitted). 
 122. Interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman, with a county frontline 
investigator, Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (describing the goal as helping 
families and explaining that classifying an injury as maltreatment provides the basis to accomplish this 
goal; emphasizing that CPS exists to protect children, not parents’ rights); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, 
Innovations in Child Maltreatment Prevention: Resolving the Tension Between Effective Assistance and 
Violations of Privacy, in PREVENTING CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 113 at 156, 158 (noting that 
“the social work community has a long history of thinking about itself as engaged in the business of 
‘child saving’ and particularly about its prophylactic interventions in the lives of children and families as 
‘helping’”). 
 123. Appellate court judges in particular seem to be inclined toward privileging parents’ rights 
above harm to the child, as they are more likely, certainly more so than CPS professionals, to interpret 
a statutory requirement of physical injury or serious physical injury to require egregious harm or 
damage to the child. See, e.g., In re C.B., J.B., Th.B., & Ti.B., 636 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) 
(providing as illustrations of incidents and outcomes meeting the definition a parent who chokes, 
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III 
THE GOVERNING PARADIGMS FOR DECISIONMAKING 
The legal actors responsible for determining where and how to draw the line 
between reasonable and unlawful corporal punishment—CPS agents and 
courts—are influenced by one of two paradigms, or by a more or less ad hoc 
combination. The first of these paradigms reflects parental-autonomy norms, 
and the second, scientific knowledge about the circumstances that cause 
children harm. The extent to which one or another of the paradigms governs 
the approach of particular individuals or institutions appears at least in part to 
reflect political or personal orientation, disciplinary training, or both.124 In view 
of our prescriptive project in part IV, which seeks intentionally to reconcile 
norms and knowledge and to propose policy reforms that reflect that 
reconciliation, this part lays the groundwork for effective multi- and 
interdisciplinary engagement by describing, first from the relevant disciplinary 
perspectives, the nature and significance of each of these approaches. 
A. Parental-Autonomy Norms 
Parental-autonomy norms reflect society’s widely held view that parents 
have the right to raise their children as they see fit, without outside interference 
from the government or others. Described variously as “parental autonomy,” 
“parents’ rights,” and “family privacy,”125 these norms—incorporated in long-
standing American political philosophy, constitutional theory, and law—
provide that a metaphorical (closed) circle or geographic boundary surrounds 
the family, in which parents are sovereigns and children, subjects of their 
 
punches, and burns a child and who pulls out her hair, and rejecting as insufficient CPS’s evidence of 
beatings with a belt causing bruises on the buttocks and elsewhere on the body that last for several days 
coupled with the child’s fear of returning home to the offending parent). 
 124. For a useful summary of the long-standing collaboration and clash between social workers and 
the law in this area, see GIOVANNONI & BECERRA, supra note 6 at 66–69. Specifically, id. at 66: 
“Together, the social welfare agencies and legal system constituted a curious commingling of the 
exercise of legal authority and the rendering of social service, with much overlap and blurring of roles. 
That tensions should arise in any system with such unclear role definitions is inevitable.”; id. at 67 
(noting that, early on, “[s]ocial workers came under criticism for their lack of knowledge about the law 
and legal procedures”); id. at 68 (suggesting that proponents of law and social work may be “more 
polarized” today than in the early twentieth century, and that “the potential for polarization . . . inheres 
in the conflicting interests of the parties in the situation”); and id. at 68–69 (describing the conflicting 
interests as being, on the one hand and for social workers, saving children from bad parents even when 
the evidence to justify this does not yet meet legal muster, and on the other hand and for the law, 
protecting parents’ rights to the custody of their children). 
 125. James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
189, 194-206 (Spring 2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1210–11 (1999) (family privacy means the right to freedom from state 
interference that belongs to the family as a unit or entity, rather than to its included individuals); 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247, 1254 
(1999) (family privacy is essentially the same thing as parental autonomy since, “[w]hen we adopt a 
theoretical framework that endows any ‘unit’ of persons with ‘autonomy,’ or a ‘right’ to be free of state 
intervention, in practice, we are conferring unregulated authority on the dominant member within this 
closed community of persons”). 
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sovereignty.126 Within this scheme, parents have both the right to physical 
custody of their children and the right to make decisions for and about them 
and their welfare.127 The latter is part of a bundle of adult decisionmaking rights 
that are known especially in constitutional jurisprudence as decisional 
autonomy.128 
When discipline is appropriate and how it is meted out are considered to be 
well within parents’ decisional autonomy. As one court explained, “The duty to 
discipline the child carries with it the right to chastise and to prescribe a course 
of conduct designed for the child’s development and welfare. This in turn 
demands that the parents be given a wide sphere of discretion.”129 Although the 
United States Supreme Court has never had occasion to rule on whether 
corporal punishment is included among parents’ federal constitutional rights, 
this disciplinary option is well-established under state law.130 Specifically, states 
have long provided parents with an exception to tort- and criminal-law 
prohibitions against physical assaults when they can establish a disciplinary 
motive for the assault and when the assault itself is “reasonable.”131 Twentieth-
century case law is thus replete with holdings like this one: “A parent has the 
right to punish a child within the bounds of moderation and reason, so long as 
he or she does it for the welfare of the child.”132 The states’ approach has its 
 
 126. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 537, 
541–42 (1996) (recalling colonial history that described the family as “distinct from that other entity, 
the state, . . . [which] must be given some decisional space,” and describing a married couple as 
“form[ing] a precinct that stands apart from and is ordinarily closed to state authority”); id. at 546 
(rejecting the conventional idea of “the family . . . as an island or refuge”). 
 127. Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3, at 546–48. 
 128. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202–
05 (1998) (describing the constitutional concept of decisional privacy). 
 129. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 656 (Wash. 1952)(en banc.). 
 130. See supra II.A (describing states’ statutory privilege). State law is significant in this context 
because its traditional forms typically influence the contours of constitutional doctrine. Coleman, Legal 
Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3 at 548–49. In other words, even though the Supreme Court 
has not decided the question, given long-standing state-law tradition, it is generally assumed that if the 
Court did have occasion to do so, it would rule that corporal punishment is within the bounds of 
parental autonomy. See also Davidson, supra note 2, at 406 (“The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized the parental right reasonably to discipline children by stating, ‘the statist notion that 
governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and 
neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.’”) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 
(1979)); Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
983, 991 n.48 (1995–1996) (discussing the Supreme Court cases that, read together, support the 
assumption that parents have a constitutional right to use corporal punishment as a form of discipline). 
 131. See Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1242–43 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that “the basic 
conception of the parental discipline defense” requires a “genuine disciplinary purpose” and the use of 
only “moderate” or “reasonable” force); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965) (providing 
that “[a] parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement 
upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education”); 
Edwards, supra note 130, at 983–84 (explaining the disciplinary exception to battery law). 
 132. Edwards, supra note 130, at 997 (describing the holding in Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 
S.E.2d 419 (Va. 1947)). See also, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett, 335 P.2d 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (noting that a 
parent “may administer reasonable punishment with impunity, but when he exceeds that limit and does 
so willfully he commits a battery and is civilly liable for the consequences”); Diehl v. Commonwealth, 
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origins in “the Colonial period, [when] . . . [corporal] punishment was thought 
to be a ‘desirable and necessary instrument of restraint upon sin and 
immorality,’ as well as having a regenerative effect on the child’s character.”133 
This view derived in turn from traditional English doctrine, which holds that a 
parent “may lawfully correct his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner, 
for this is for the benefit of his education.”134 Modern maltreatment law has 
adopted this common-law exception.135 
In general, parental autonomy is viewed as being good for society, good for 
parents, and good for children. Political philosophy and constitutional theory 
teach that parental autonomy is good for society because the family is 
considered to be the fundamental—as in first and foundational—social unit of 
society. This is the concept of the family as a village within a town, within a 
county, within a state, within the country; the village being primarily and in the 
first instance responsible for bringing up the young to become well-adjusted, 
productive individuals and citizens.136 Parental autonomy is also said to be good 
for society because children need to be raised by some adult(s), and neither the 
state itself nor any other individual or group of adults can replace parents as 
“first best caretakers,”137 and because society’s interest in the perpetuation of 
heterogenic democracy is best fulfilled when an ideologically diverse group of 
individuals raises the children.138 Parental autonomy is viewed as being good for 
 
385 S.E.2d 228, 230 (Va. App. Ct. 1989) (“[W]hile a parent has the right to discipline his or her child the 
punishment must be within the bounds of moderation. If the parent exceeds due moderation, he or she 
becomes criminally liable.”). 
 133. Edwards, supra note 130, at 988 (“Since a child’s original nature was considered evil, corporal 
punishment enabled the child to become a fit person, and any failure was seen as a matter of 
inadequate application.”). Modern thought on the need for and benefits of corporal punishment is 
remarkably unchanged. See, e.g., id. at 990 (explaining the modern view that “the principle effect of 
corporal punishment is that children learn to obey and respect authority. Further, it builds character, 
prevents bad behavior from reoccurring, and improves discipline.”). 
 134. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *542. 
 135. See supra II.A . 
 136. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 965 
(1993) (noting the historical construction of the family as “a little commonwealth”); HERMAN 
HUMPHREY, DOMESTIC EDUCATION (1840), reprinted in 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 351–52 (Robert Bremner ed., 1970) (“Every family is a little state, or 
empire within itself . . . . Every Father is the constituted head and ruler of his household. God has made 
him the supreme earthly legislator over his children . . . .”); William E. McCurdy, Torts Between 
Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1076–77 (1930) (noting that the family is a 
“domestic government” and that “the head of the family is clothed with broad authority . . . similar to 
that of a sovereign”); see also LAURENCE THOMAS, THE FAMILY AND POLITICAL SELF 83–129 
(arguing from Rousseau that “‘[t]he family is the first model of political societies’”). 
 137. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–03 (1923) (discussing the downsides of alternative child-
rearing models); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 (describing the law’s view of parents as children’s 
“‘first best’ caretakers”); Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3 at 536–37 (using this principle in 
the context of child welfare investigations). 
 138. Dailey, supra note 136, at 959 (“[T]he family acts as an important institutional check on the 
power of the state to mold citizens in its own image.”); id. at 996 (“[P]arental authority . . . is necessary 
for the development of responsible individuals who have been raised with a sense of belonging to 
distinct and diverse moral traditions.”). 
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parents because it honors the “natural bonds of affection” that tie them to their 
children and also because it compensates them for taking on the responsibilities 
of parenting.139 Finally, parental autonomy is viewed as being good for children 
because, among the adults and institutions that might be imagined as caregivers, 
parents, guided by their natural bonds of affection, are most likely to take the 
best care of their own children and to do the best job raising them to be 
successful adults.140 That aspect of parental autonomy that sees the family as 
sovereign territory is specifically viewed as being good for children because, 
when parent and child are bonded, interference by outsiders to the relationship 
harms their emotional and developmental well-being.141 
The theories that support parental autonomy have changed significantly 
over time. Throughout the nineteenth century, children were generally 
considered to be one with or the property of their parents (generally of their 
fathers).142 By the end of the twentieth century, however, these unity and 
property models of the parent–child relationship were considered anachronistic. 
Today, children are generally believed to be proper subjects of individualism, 
albeit with an evolving capacity for mature, thoughtful decisionmaking.143 The 
concept of the family as sovereign territory protected against interference by a 
circle of privacy has not changed, although the right of the state to break the 
 
 139. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (“[T]he Court has emphasized the paramount 
interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of parents are a counterpart of the 
responsibilities they have assumed.”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Parents generally, 
‘have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional 
obligations.’”) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)); see also GIOVANNONI & 
BECERRA, supra note 6, at 34–35 (quoting Blackstone, who wrote that “[t]he duty of parents for the 
maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law; an obligation . . . laid down on them not only 
by nature herself . . . in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner injurious 
to their issue, if they only gave their children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.”); 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297–98 (1988) (describing the 
traditional view of “parenthood as exchange”). 
 140. As Emily Buss has written, 
[A] legal system that shows strong deference to parents’ child-rearing decisions serves 
children well. Parents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and considerable 
knowledge of their particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most qualified to 
assess and pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances. In contrast, the state’s 
knowledge of and commitment to any particular child is relatively thin. A scheme of strong 
constitutional rights shields the parent expert from the intrusive second-guessing of the less 
expert state. 
“Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002). See also DAVIS et al., supra note 10, at 1 (noting that 
the arrangement established under the doctrine of parental autonomy is “assumed . . . [to] serve both 
the interests of children and of society”). 
 141. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 520–21, 536–37; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19–20, and passim (1973) (arguing that interference in 
or disruption of a bonded parent–child relationship can cause harm to the child). 
 142. Edwards, supra note 130, at 986–89 (discussing this theoretical background and its application 
in the corporal punishment context); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A 
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 313 (1998). 
 143. Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3, at 615–16; GIOVANNONI & 
BECERRA, supra note 6 at 32–36. 
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circle and to enter into the family to protect its vulnerable members has 
increased substantially.144 
Legal doctrine has changed correspondingly. Parents can no longer lease 
their children’s services out to others for the duration of their childhoods, nor 
choose whether or not to school them, nor impose what in some cases once 
amounted to a parentally inflicted death penalty for disrespect and other 
important transgressions.145 The boundaries of family privacy are now drawn at 
a point that balances parents’ interests and rights with those of children and the 
state. Thus, parents’ rights to force children to work for hire have been curtailed 
according to their developmental capacity for such work and to assure that they 
have the time to go to school and to rest so that they are at least competent at 
that enterprise.146 Parents’ right to choose where their children are educated is 
intact, but gone is their right not to educate their children at all, because 
children need an education to be successful citizens.147 Finally, although “[i]t is 
clear that a parent has the ‘right’ to corporally discipline his or her child, a right 
derived from our constitutional right to privacy[,] . . . this right . . . must be 
exercised in a ‘reasonable’ manner.”148 Reasonableness has always been the 
standard, of course, but because its legal iteration is tied to social norms, as 
these norms evolve to countenance less harm and, at least in some 
circumstances, to narrow the forms of acceptable corporal punishment, parental 
autonomy and the boundaries of family privacy have been correspondingly 
reduced.149 
 
 144. See, e.g., Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 533 (describing “the need for the state 
to intrude into the circle of family privacy when a child likely needs to be rescued”); David D. Meyer, 
The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 529-30 (2008) (discussing “the circle of 
family privacy protection” in the current context). 
 145. Coleman, Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 3, at 615–17. 
 146. DAVIS et al., supra note 10, at 16–17, 32. 
 147. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (“The power of the state to compel attendance 
at some school . . . is not questioned.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925): 
No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to 
inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of 
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic 
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that 
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. 
 148. In re J.P., 692 N.E.2d 338, 345 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998). 
 149. Murray A. Straus, Prevalence, Societal Causes, and Trends in Corporal Punishment by Parents 
in World Perspective, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 22-29 (Spring 2010) (explaining that social 
science research has documented recent rapid and marked changes in social norms and cultural 
acceptance regarding the frequency and manner of corporal punishment of children in both American 
society and worldwide); Edwards, supra note 130, at 985, 1000, 1008, 1019 (describing evolving attitudes 
about corporal punishment, parental rights, and child abuse, and noting specifically that “American 
society has tolerated less and less severe forms of corporal punishment during the last generation.”). 
Two criteria traditionally have informed the reasonableness of parental behavior and, thus, the legal 
limits of parental autonomy. One criterion is the degree of harm to the child. See supra II.C.1.a and 
infra III.B. The other criterion is cultural norms as these evolve over time. Regardless or independent 
of degree of harm to the child, parental autonomy tends to be respected as long as a parental practice 
does not stretch too far beyond culturally specific notions of normativeness. Norms are defined both by 
statistical frequency and cultural tolerance. Thus, parental autonomy is allowed if the practice is not too 
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Lawyers and the judiciary, particularly appellate judges, are well versed in 
the legal doctrine of parental autonomy and its philosophical underpinnings. 
Indeed, if the question before the court involves, in some respect, a parent’s 
right to make a child-rearing decision, the constitutional doctrine of parental 
autonomy will and should be front and center. For the court, this doctrine 
embodies “first principles” and as such is the law that applies to the case. This is 
true whether the question is presented as a federal constitutional claim150 or as a 
state-law claim that itself reflects this constitutional norm.151 Finally, because 
federal constitutional law formally preempts all other laws—including 
government-issued regulations, policies, or protocols—inconsistent perspectives 
on the factors that should influence where and how the line between reasonable 
corporal punishment and abuse is drawn are largely irrelevant to the legal 
process.152 
For present purposes, this means that lawyers and the judiciary will always 
be inclined to test CPS interventions designed to protect the welfare of the child 
against the right of family privacy or parental autonomy, and they will generally 
read child-abuse definitions and corporal-punishment exceptions through this 
lens. Thus, for example, judges in jurisdictions where the governing statute 
requires a finding of “serious” abuse before punishment is unlawful may read 
“serious” most seriously, to require that CPS show that the injury was life-
threatening or at least permanently disfiguring. In such jurisdictions, “mere” 
bruising, even bruising lasting for several days and in circumstances where the 
child was afraid to return home, might be an insufficient basis to allow CPS to 
breach the circle of family privacy.153 Relatedly, CPS interventions based in 
 
unusual; that is, as long as the behavior is also practiced by at least some other accepted members of the 
society. Official tolerance may also increase the statistical normativeness of a corporal-punishment 
practice; tolerance and normativeness undoubtedly reciprocally influence each other. Corporal 
punishment to the buttocks, for example, is allowed partly because it is statistically normative. In the 
United States, the majority of children between ages two and five have been corporally punished, even 
though parents report using corporal punishment relatively rarely, peaking at one and a half times per 
month when children are two years old and decreasing to less than once per month by the time children 
are twelve years old. M.A. Straus and J.H. Stewart, Corporal Punishment by American Parents: 
National Data on Prevalence, Chronicity, Severity, and Duration, in Relation to Child and Family 
Characteristics, 2 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 5, 59–60 (1999). Male circumcision is also 
statistically normative, even though it causes the sort of harm to the child that would otherwise qualify 
as abuse. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and 
Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 757 n.185 (1998); Dwyer, supra note 125, at 201-04. In contrast, 
corporal punishment to the genitals would receive much closer scrutiny by authorities simply because it 
is less common, whether or not it causes actual harm to the child. 
 150. A claim that the state has violated a parent’s constitutional right of parental autonomy would 
be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and, if the claim was religiously grounded, also under 
the First. 
 151. A claim that the state has violated a parent’s right to use corporal punishment to discipline a 
child would be brought under the common-law or statutory-discipline exception relevant to the 
proceedings in issue, that is, tort law, criminal law, or civil-maltreatment law. 
 152. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 392 (3d ed. 2006). 
 153. See, e.g., In re C.B. J.B., Th.B., & Ti.B., 636 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C.  Ct. App. 2006). 
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concerns that are perceived to be inconsistent with the right of family privacy or 
parental autonomy are not likely to be upheld. It appears, for example, that 
judges tend to reject as unlawful interventions that rest (or appear to rest) 
primarily on CPS concerns about the child’s emotional and developmental 
welfare, preferring instead to focus on the physical harm caused by the injury at 
issue in the case.154 
Florida family-court judge Cindy Lederman has suggested that judges’ 
tendency to focus on physical harm is due at least in part to the fact that most 
are neither trained to appreciate the correlation between physical injury and 
emotional and developmental welfare nor provided by litigants with evidence-
based science that would permit them to evaluate claims of this sort.155 
Moreover, most litigants probably do not provide the basis for courts to 
understand how this kind of evidence might actually be compatible with the 
right of family privacy and parental autonomy, particularly with its boundaries. 
In other words, litigants do not appear to work systematically to make the 
evidence of emotional and developmental welfare relevant to the courts, given 
the courts’ particular orientation and doctrinal constraints. As a result, it 
sometimes appears that CPS intervenes in the family to protect a child based on 
a combination of concerns, including about the child’s emotional and 
developmental welfare, only to have the court reject the intervention because 
the physical injury is viewed as insufficient (standing alone) to permit it. 
B. Scientific Knowledge of Harm to the Child 
Beyond parental-autonomy norms, a reasonable manner of corporal 
punishment is defined scientifically by the degree of harm caused or risked. In 
cases of extreme physical injury, serious harm is immediately obvious through 
the observation (sometimes by a medical expert) of welts, bruises, or bleeding. 
In other cases, harm must be inferred on the basis of medical and scientific 
knowledge of the likely effects of a particular kind of assault. This knowledge, 
and the corresponding legal judgment of whether an assault constitutes physical 
abuse, has evolved over time. Decisionmakers, perhaps especially CPS 
professionals, have increasingly defined serious harm to include delayed 
internal injuries, long-term disability, and even psychological or emotional 
disorders. And they have increasingly relied on scientific research to conclude 
whether a particular parent’s behavior is likely to cause “serious harm” to the 
 
 154. See id. (focusing exclusively on physical evidence and implicitly excluding as irrelevant to the 
determination whether reasonable corporal punishment or abuse had occurred, evidence concerning 
the chronicity of the corporal punishment, and the children’s related fear of returning home to their 
father); supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text (describing one CPS agency’s experience with the 
courts’ disinterest in emotional and developmental evidence, notwithstanding the relevance of this 
evidence to its own determinations). 
 155. Lederman, supra note 113, at 173 and passim. 
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victim, as well as whether a child’s symptoms are likely to have been caused by 
parent’s abusive behavior or by some other source, such as an accidental fall.156 
Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS), also known as abusive head trauma and the 
leading cause of abuse-related deaths in the United States each year, provides a 
model for the way scientific evidence has been used effectively by CPS and in 
the legal system.157 Frustrated parents of crying babies under the age of twelve 
months sometimes shake the baby back and forth or up and down in an effort to 
stop the crying. This behavior can indeed place the infant into a trancelike state. 
Although no adverse effect on the infant may be apparent immediately, recent 
medical research has shown that the long-term consequences can be devastating 
due to an infant’s unique and fragile anatomy.158 Infants are born with weak 
neck muscles that cannot hold up a large head, which is prone to jostle back and 
forth uncontrollably while being shaken. Infants’ brains are soft and malleable, 
like unset gelatin, in contrast with adults’ brains, which are more like set gelatin. 
Rapid back-and-forth head movement from shaking can rupture blood vessels 
and nerves throughout the brain, tearing and destroying brain tissue. Although 
immediate symptoms may be minimal, over weeks the infant may develop 
irritability, lethargy, tremors, vomiting, retinal detachment, and seizures, and in 
some situations, may even lapse into a coma or die. Babies who survive the 
experience with none of these consequences may still suffer cerebral palsy or 
mental retardation, effects that may not become evident until after age six.159 
One influential study determined that seventy-two percent of known victims 
suffer permanent neuro-developmental abnormalities or death.160 
The anatomy and long-term consequences of internal head injury due to 
shaking have been discovered only over the past twenty-five years. Because 
there is no blunt injury, SBS is difficult to detect, so the phenomenon has been 
doubted.161 Medical reports as recent as 1987 claimed that shaking could not be 
 
 156. See D. L. Chadwick et al., Annual Risk of Death Resulting From Short Falls Among Young 
Children: Less Than 1 in 1 Million, 121 PEDIATRICS 1213 (2008). 
 157. See id. (focusing exclusively on physical evidence and implicitly excluding as irrelevant to the 
determination whether reasonable corporal punishment or abuse had occurred, evidence concerning 
the chronicity of the corporal punishment, and the children’s related fear of returning home to their 
father); supra notes 111–122 and accompanying text (describing one CPS agency’s experience with the 
courts’ disinterest in emotional and developmental evidence, notwithstanding the relevance of this 
evidence to its own determinations). 
 158. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, Shaken Baby 
Syndrome: Rotational Cranial Injuries Technical Report, 108 PEDIATRICS 206, 208 (2001). 
 159. H. T. Keenan, et al., A Population-Based Comparison of Clinical and Outcome Characteristics 
of Young Children With Serious Inflicted and Noninflicted Traumatic Brain Injury, 114 PEDIATRICS 
633, 638 (2004); J. Punt et al., The ‘Unified Hypothesis’ of Geddes et al. is Not Supported by the Data, 7 
PEDIATRIC REHABILITATION 173, 173 (specifically addressing cerebral palsy as a delayed outcome). 
 160. K. M. Barlow, E. Thomas, & R. A. Minns, Neurological and Neuropsychological Outcome of 
Non-Accidental Head Injury, 3 EUR. J. OF PAEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY A139 (1999) (Abstract). 
 161. Mark Donohoe, The Evidence Base for Shaken Baby Syndrome: Meaning of Signature Must be 
Made Explicit, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 741, 741 (2004). 
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the cause of permanent injury.162 But these reports later proved inaccurate 
because they were based on experiments with primates, who have stronger neck 
muscles than infants.163 More-recent research using experiments on pig brains (a 
more scientifically accurate comparison), infant autopsies, and longitudinal 
follow-up of known cases have combined to validate the syndrome.164 
SBS is now well-accepted by courts as a medical diagnosis,165 and shaking a 
baby is increasingly litigated as physical abuse in the juvenile and criminal 
courts.166 The history of SBS is important for corporal-punishment cases 
generally because it establishes the role of scientific evidence in the 
identification of parental behavior (sometimes even normative parental 
behavior) as abuse. “Serious harm,” which is the criterion for abuse in most 
jurisdictions, includes not only immediately obvious physical injury but also 
internal brain damage and long-term psychological and cognitive disability. 
Because legal cases cannot wait for an ultimate outcome, which might not be 
apparent for years, published scientific research suffices as evidence that a 
particular parental behavior is abusive. 
Scientific evidence on the consequences of other forms of corporal 
punishment has also accumulated over the past twenty-five years.167 This 
evidence has contributed to an understanding that even apparently moderate 
forms of corporal punishment like SBS—moderate in the sense that a severe 
physical injury is not apparent to the average layperson—can have harmful 
effects that merit intervention, and to a more-comprehensive sense of the 
consequences of severe corporal punishment.168 These effects are stronger if the 
child is young, if the parent–child relationship lacks a grounding in warmth, and 
if the corporal punishment is repeated across time. Rather than discovering a 
 
 162. A. Duhaime, et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Clinical, Pathological, and Biomechanical 
Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409, 414 (1987). 
 163. Mary E. Case, Abusive Head Injury in Infants and Young Children, 9 LEGAL MED. 83 (2007). 
 164. Keenan et al; supra note 159 at 636; R.A. Minns, ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome:’ Theoretical and 
Evidential Controversies, 35 J.  ROYAL C.  PHYSICIANS  EDINBURGH 5, 8–10 (2005). 
 165. E.g., State v. McClary, 541 A.2d 96, 102 (Conn. 1988) (holding that SBS is a well accepted 
medical diagnosis); State v. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d 390, 393 (S.C. 1991). 
 166. Brian. K. Holmgren, Assistant District Attorney General, Davidson County, Tennessee, 
Irresponsible Expert Testimony, http://www.dontshake.org/sbs.php?topNavID=3&subNavID 
=28&navID=115 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
 167. This literature distinguishes the experience of physical abuse from the experience of corporal 
punishment, although corporal punishment is usually graded on a continuum of severity and chronicity 
that ends in abuse. Indeed, eleven states (Florida, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia) and the District of Columbia 
declare that “excessive corporal punishment” constitutes child maltreatment, and an additional eleven 
states declare that corporal punishment is maltreatment if it is “cruel” (Connecticut, Colorado, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota), “unlawful” (California), “excessive or unreasonable” 
(Wyoming), “severe” (New Jersey), “cruel and inhuman” (Kansas), or “ extreme” (Maine). Howard 
Davidson, The Legal Aspects of Corporal Punishment in the Home: When Does Physical Discipline 
Cross the Line to Become Child Abuse?, 17 CHILD. LEGAL RIGHTS J., 18, 20, 23–25 (1997). 
 168. L. J. Berlin et al., Correlates and Consequences of Spanking and Verbal Punishment for Low-
Income White, African-American, and Mexican-American Toddlers, 80 CHILD DEV. 1403, 1411–12 
(2009). 
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cut-off level below which corporal punishment has no ill effects, scientists 
interpret the research findings as indicating that corporal punishment 
experiences have a cumulative effect that grows proportionately with the 
amount and severity of punishment. Furthermore, the relation between 
corporal punishment and poor child outcomes is an empirical one, meaning that 
not every case of corporal punishment is followed by child maladjustment. 
A review of eighty-eight empirical studies involving 36,309 children has 
shown that children who have been subjected to moderate corporal punishment 
display, on average, more-immediate compliance with parental directives but 
also higher levels of aggressive, delinquent, and antisocial behavior than do 
children who have not been corporally punished.169 The causal direction of this 
association has been called into question170 because antisocial children might 
well elicit more corporal punishment or because the same genes that make 
parents use aggression toward their children may be responsible for their child’s 
aggression, apart from any causal link between the parenting and the child’s 
behavior.171 Indeed, when common genes are controlled, the causal impact of 
corporal punishment on the child’s aggression is lessened but still present.172 
Other longitudinal studies have followed corporally punished and 
noncorporally punished children over years to examine growth in antisocial 
behavior and the onset of new outcomes due to corporal punishment. With 
these empirical controls in place, the impact of corporal punishment on 
American children can now be estimated with greater confidence. Two recent, 
rigorously conducted studies illuminate the picture. One study, which followed 
3,001 white, African American, and Mexican low-income toddlers from ages 
one to three, found that, even after controlling for fussiness or other factors that 
might lead a parent to spank a young child, the experience of being spanked 
even modestly caused children to become more aggressive and to have lower 
cognitive development (as measured by the well-validated Bayley Scales of 
Infant Development).173 A second study followed two cohorts of children: the 
first, a group of 499 children followed from ages five to sixteen; the second, a 
group of 258 children followed from ages five to fifteen. This study found that in 
both cohorts, chronic mild spanking in children from ages five to nine led to 
increased antisocial behavior problems in adolescence. 174 It must be noted that 
 
 169. Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child 
Behaviors and Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539, 541 
(2002). 
 170. Diana Baumrind, Robert. E. Larzelere & Philip A. Cowan, Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is it 
Harmful? Comment on Gershoff (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 580, 585 (2002). 
 171. Sara R. Jaffee et al., The Limits of Child Effects: Evidence for Genetically Mediated Child 
Effects on Corporal Punishment but Not on Physical Maltreatment, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
1047, 1053 (2004). 
 172. Id. at 1053–56. 
 173. Berlin et al., supra note 168, at 1412. 
 174. Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Trajectories of Physical Discipline: Early Childhood Antecedents 
and Developmental Outcomes, 80 CHILD DEV. 1385, 1397–1401 (2009). 
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the children who suffered these outcomes were regularly spanked mildly over a 
long period of time, which was not the case in other studies where the child 
subjects experienced mild spanking very infrequently.175 The best scientific 
evidence thus indicates that the impact of regular mild spanking on a child aged 
one to nine appears, on average, to be significantly adverse but modest in 
magnitude.176 In general, children who have been regularly, mildly corporally 
punished by parents are likely to become less cognitively skilled and more 
aggressive over time and to use aggression in solving future problems, including 
in raising their children; rarely, however, do they become criminally violent as a 
result of mild corporal punishment alone.177 
Nuances complicate this picture, however: First, mild corporal punishments 
do not have a uniform impact on child outcomes across all contexts and 
circumstances. The parent’s behavior per se is less significant than the meaning 
of the behavior as interpreted by the child.178 This meaning is determined by the 
family context, including chronicity of the act, the contingency of the act on the 
child’s misbehavior, mitigating factors such as temporary stress and the child’s 
instigation of the act, and exacerbating factors such as parents’ taunting and 
psychological abuse. Thus, empirical studies demonstrate that corporal 
punishment can be helpful, unimportant, or harmful to the child’s development, 
depending on the meaning ascribed by the child. A limit on this conclusion is 
that, beyond a certain level of severity of corporal punishment, harmful 
outcomes are likely to accrue to the child no matter what context surrounds the 
act or how it is interpreted by the child.179 This level is not always clear but may 
be a defining characteristic of physical abuse. 
Second, not all corporal punishments are administered in the same way, and 
the different ways have different impacts. Although it would be simpler if 
detrimental corporal-punishment behaviors could be defined by specific 
behaviors, research studies indicate that the behavior itself is less prognostic 
than the behavior in its context. Multiple studies have shown that when 
corporal punishment is administered calmly for teaching purposes within a 
family context of parent–child warmth, its negative consequences for the child 
are minimal; in contrast, when administered in anger, impulsively, or out of 
control, corporal punishment is more likely to lead to adverse consequences in 
 
 175. Straus & Stewart, supra note 149, at 64–66. 
 176. Kirby Deater-Deckard et al., Physical Discipline among African American and European 
American Mothers: Links to Children’s Externalizing Behaviors, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1065, 
1069–70 (1996). 
 177. As explained infra note 180 and in the accompanying text, these outcomes (that is, lowered 
cognitive skills, increased aggressive behavior, and increased use of aggression when parenting) for the 
corporally punished child qualify as functional impairments according to established medical practice. 
 178. Deater-Deckard et al.,  supra note 176, at 1069–70. 
 179. Id. at 1070. 
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the child, including increased anxiety and aggressive behavior.180 When corporal 
punishment is administered capriciously, inconsistently, and with accompanying 
verbal and psychological abuse, its impact is more harmful. One reason for 
these differences is that the child is likely to interpret the parent’s actions 
differently in these various contexts. When mild corporal punishment is 
administered calmly for teaching purposes, the child is likely to understand the 
parent’s positive intent, whereas when it is administered harshly, inconsistently, 
and angrily, the child is more likely to interpret the act as rejection and to react 
with anxiety and increased deviant behavior over time.181 
Third, cross-cultural studies across the world have shown that the cultural 
normativeness of corporal punishment alters the impact that it has on a child.182 
If a corporal-punishment behavior is relatively common in a culture (such as 
mild spanking with a bare hand one to three times across the buttocks, as in the 
United States), then the child is more likely to understand its teaching value 
and is less likely to develop adverse reactions than if the corporal-punishment 
behavior is highly unusual (such as placing hot pepper on a child’s tongue, 
which is unusual in the United States but more common in other cultures). 
Studies have revealed that spanking has less-deleterious effects in Kenya and 
India, where it is ubiquitous, than in China and Thailand, where it is relatively 
rare.183 Ironically, as corporal punishment becomes less common in American 
society, parents who continue to engage in this practice may find that it begins 
to have stronger adverse effects on their children.184 
In contrast with the nuanced and paradoxical effects of mild corporal 
punishment, corporal punishment that is cruel or severe has been found in 
multiple studies to have deleterious consequences. These consequences are 
diversely manifested and vary across children but can be summarized as 
disability, or “functional impairment,” a term adapted from medical sciences.185 
In psychiatry, a symptom such as alcohol consumption, sadness, or repetitive 
odd behavior is not diagnostic of a disorder unless it is accompanied by 
 
 180. Kenneth Dodge, V. C. McLoyd & Jennifer E. Lansford, The Cultural Context of Physically 
Disciplining Children, in EMERGING ISSUES IN AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE: CONTEXT, 
ADAPTATION, AND POLICY 245 (V.C. McLoyd, N.E. Hill & Kenneth Dodge eds., 2005). 
 181. Id. The moderating factors that affect the impact of parental corporal punishment on a child’s 
outcome are very similar to the factors that judges use to decide whether a parental behavior is abusive. 
Judges may already intuitively understand the factors that determine the harmfulness of a behavior, 
although the systematic use of scientific evidence would ensure more uniform application of this 
knowledge. 
 182. Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Physical Discipline and Children’s Adjustment: Cultural 
Normativeness as a Moderator, 76 CHILD DEVEL. 1234, 1244 (2005). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (describing this trend). Lest one conclude that if 
severe corporal punishment were to become ubiquitous its adverse impact would be nil, cross-cultural 
studies have shown that there is a residual effect of a cultural norm that endorses such punishment of 
children: such societies are likely to have higher rates of adult violence and even war. Jennifer E. 
Lansford & Kenneth Dodge, Cultural Norms for Adult Corporal Punishment of Children and Societal 
Rates of Endorsement and Use of Violence, 8 PARENTING: SCI. & PRACTICE 257, 266–67 (2008). 
 185. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (defining functional impairment). 
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impairment in completing the tasks of daily life, such as holding down a job and 
maintaining relationships. Applied to corporal punishment, if the consequences 
for the child include functional impairment, then the parental actions are 
serious enough to be characterized as physical abuse. 
Long-term follow-ups of children found by CPS to have been maltreated 
indicate that they are likely to suffer a variety of functional impairments, 
including an increased tendency to commit violent crime, to abuse alcohol and 
drugs, to acquire sexually transmitted diseases, to suffer from depression, and to 
victimize their own children.186 Although these studies bring the certainty that 
comes with identifying and following children whose physical abuse has been 
officially substantiated, they are complicated by the problem that the 
interventions accompanying official substantiation (such as removal from the 
home and labeling the child as abused) might be the actual adverse causal agent 
rather than the abuse per se. 
Another group of studies has followed community samples of children who 
were identified by researchers as having been severely corporally punished; the 
identification in these studies was made based on confidential interviews with 
the children’s parents.187 Their design contrasts children who have experienced 
severe corporal punishment with those who have experienced either no 
corporal punishment or only mild corporal punishment. Like the long-term 
follow-ups of children found by CPS to have been maltreated, these studies also 
reveal that physically maltreated children are likely to suffer numerous adverse 
outcomes, including being arrested for violent as well as nonviolent offenses, 
dropping out of school, becoming a teenage parent, and being fired from 
employment.188 These outcomes hold across cultural groups and family contexts, 
suggesting a fairly universal adverse impact of the experience of physical 
abuse.189 
In sum, scientific findings have established that the experience of corporal 
punishment has consequences for the child. For mild and normative levels of 
corporal punishment, these consequences may include, on the positive end, 
immediate compliance with parental commands and, on the negative end, 
increased anxiety, aggressive behavior, decreased academic success, and lower 
self-esteem.190 The cost–benefit ratio of these consequences seems adverse to 
some observers but acceptable to others. In this society and according to the 
law, the decision about the acceptability of this parental behavior rests with the 
parent under the principle of parental autonomy to the extent that the 
 
 186. Ruth Gilbert et al., Child Maltreatment: Burden and Consequences in High-Income Countries, 
373 LANCET 68, 76–77 (2009). 
 187. Kenneth A. Dodge, J.E. Bates & G.S. Pettit, Mechanisms in the Cycle of Violence, 250 SCI. 
1678, 1678 (1990); Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Early Physical Abuse and Later Violent Delinquency: A 
Prospective Longitudinal Study, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 233, 233 (2007). 
 188. Id. at 238. 
 189. Id. at 240. 
 190. Gershoff, supra note 169, at 549–50; Chih (Peter) L. Chen, Is There a Right Way to Discipline a 
Child, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 106–07 (2007). 
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consequences, on average, do not exceed the threshold that would lead to 
functional impairment. Depending on the severity, chronicity, or context of 
corporal punishment, however, parental behavior can also harm the child, 
including to the level of functional impairment, and that thus should be 
identified as physical abuse. 
Except in obvious and very extreme cases, developmental science cannot 
guide the identification of specific parental behaviors that will lead inevitably to 
the child’s functional impairment. It cannot be concluded, for example, that six 
swats to the buttocks will lead to impairment but four will not, or that one swat 
to a two-year-old will lead to impairment but several swats to a seven-year-old 
will not. The problem is not only that prediction is probabilistic; but a confident 
prediction comes also from understanding the meaning of the behaviors rather 
than the behaviors themselves.191 Here, developmental science can be 
informative. Corporal punishment is likely to lead to functional impairment to 
the extent that the child (even a toddler or infant) experiences and interprets 
the parent’s actions as rejecting, hateful, or threatening. 
Guidelines for the decisionmaker come from features of both the parent’s 
behavior and the child’s reaction. Parents’ corporal-punishment behaviors are 
relatively likely to lead to the child’s functional impairment if the punishment is 
committed in the heat of anger or out of control (such as alcohol-induced 
behavior); if it communicates rejection of the child (as when accompanied by 
hateful words); if it is intentionally cruel, not embedded in a broader 
relationship of trust and security between parent and child, or if not obviously 
intended to help the child learn a specific lesson; if it indicates no understanding 
of the child’s ability to receive the message of the behavior; or if it is not 
preceded by the child’s misbehavior. 
On the child’s end, parental corporal-punishment behaviors are relatively 
likely to lead to functional impairment if the child experiences fundamental 
attachment insecurity (indicated by overdependence, avoidance, or dissociative 
behaviors), if the child indicates a strong fear of being alone with the parent, or 
if the child communicates feeling hated or rejected by the parent. Although 
being fearful of corporal punishment itself is not sufficient to constitute a 
functional impairment, a resulting disruption of the child’s secure attachment to 
a parent is. Of course, children sometimes lie or fail to communicate clearly, 
and so clinical judgment by a skilled professional may be particularly helpful to 
this process. 
In the end, the decision whether a parent’s behavior constitutes physical 
abuse may be best construed as a judgment by a scientifically informed expert. 
This judgment is not arbitrary, however, and can be made based on the meaning 
 
 191. See Kenneth Dodge, John D. Coie & Donald Lynam, Aggression and Antisocial Behavior in 
Youth, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, AND PERSONALITY 
DEVELOPMENT 719 (Nancy Eisenberg ed., 6th ed. 2006); see generally Kenneth Dodge, Translational 
Science in Action: Hostile Attributional Style and the Development of Aggressive Behavior Problems, 18 
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 791 (2006). 
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that the behavior communicates to the child and the meaning that the child 
makes of the pattern. 
IV.  
RECONCILING NORMS AND KNOWLEDGE AND PROPOSALS FOR POLICY 
REFORM 
This article began with the premise that modern child-abuse definitions have 
three negative effects that require periodic reconsideration: (1) The definitions 
fail to fulfill the expressive or signaling function of the law; that is, they fail to 
give meaningful guidance to the relevant legal actors. (2) The definitions yield 
inconsistent case outcomes. And (3) they risk unacceptable errors, including 
both false-positive and false-negative findings of maltreatment. Part II 
elaborated on these points, describing what is known about where and how 
legislatures, CPS, and the courts draw the line between reasonable and unlawful 
corporal punishment. Part III described the normative and scientific 
assumptions that sometimes operate in tandem and sometimes compete for 
primacy as this line is drawn, in particular by the courts and CPS. This last part 
begins with an argument for reforms to ameliorate the negative effects of 
modern child-abuse definitions that reflect both parental-autonomy norms and 
scientific knowledge, and follows with specific suggestions for policy reform. 
A. An Argument for an Intentional Reconciliation of Norms and Knowledge 
Law governing where and how to draw the line between reasonable 
corporal punishment and abuse ought to reflect a reconciliation of parental-
autonomy norms and scientific evidence about the circumstances that cause 
children real harm. These two paradigms together should govern the 
development of the operative legal definitions and process because, separately 
and at times in combination, they are the approaches currently used by the 
relevant legal actors. In contemporary American society, which values both 
parental autonomy and healthy child development, it makes good policy sense 
to respect parents’ decisions about disciplining their children and to permit 
intervention in the family only when children are harmed or in jeopardy of 
harm. Moreover, intervention in the family itself causes or risks harm to 
children and families and thus ought to be avoided unless supported by reliable 
indicia that intervention will do more good than harm.192 
Reconciling these paradigms should not be ad hoc or based on intuition or 
presumed knowledge. Rather, it ought to be intentional: parental-autonomy 
norms should take primacy when they are firmly entrenched in legal theory and 
doctrine. Conversely, they should yield when they are not so entrenched and 
when relevant and reliable scientific evidence indicates that deference will cause 
real harm to children. Relevant and reliable scientific evidence should take 
 
 192. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at notes 7–10 and 308–17 and accompanying 
text. 
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primacy over personal opinions, whatever their basis. And such evidence should 
otherwise be treated consistently with evidence law generally, as being both 
admissible and useful to the evaluation of individual cases. Our proposal for 
policy reform is thus based on the framework of parental autonomy and calls 
for scientific evidence to be introduced within this framework. 
Consistent with this intentional reconciliation of evidence and norms, we 
propose that the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse be 
drawn at the point—which we acknowledge will be blurry at times—where valid 
evidence, based in the scientific literature or current case circumstances, 
indicates that parental conduct has caused or risks causing functional 
impairment.193 With this criterion, we reject concern for parental behavior that 
would prevent an average-functioning child from achieving a higher level; we 
concern ourselves only with parental behavior that causes or risks disability or 
impairment. This standard—as opposed to a weaker or stronger one—is 
appropriate because it best balances the society’s respect for parental autonomy 
and science’s findings about when children are actually harmed by corporal 
punishment. Specifically, it is consistent with long-standing parental autonomy 
and corporal-punishment law, which draw the line of impermissibility at assaults 
that are either not in the child’s best interests or that will accomplish the 
opposite of the goal of the corporal-punishment exception—securing the child’s 
future as a law-abiding and otherwise successful child and citizen.194 Notably, the 
rationales underlying the traditional corporal-punishment exception focus on 
the child’s intellectual and emotional development, not on the child’s physical 
well-being. Indeed, these rationales assume that physical punishment can 
positively affect intellectual and emotional development. In evaluating the 
reasonableness of corporal punishment, many decisionmakers prefer to focus 
exclusively on the immediate physical impacts of corporal punishment and to 
ignore or minimize emotional and developmental ones. Doing so, however, is 
antithetical to the purposes of the exception. The functional-impairment 
standard is also consistent with CPS’s role in the line-drawing process, which—
the views of some professionals to the contrary—is to balance the harm that 
parents are or may be causing their children against the harm risked by 
 
 193. Functional impairment refers to short- or long-term or permanent impairment of emotional or 
physical functioning in tasks of daily living. See supra III.B. 
 194. For example, corporal punishment that causes a child to fail academically, to have disciplinary 
problems in school, to be fearful of personal relationships, or to become a violent adult, achieves 
precisely the opposite of the result intended by the corporal punishment exception—that is, a law-
abiding and otherwise successful adult. The standard that defines unlawful corporal punishment must 
provide the relevant legal actors with the basis to classify such punishment as abuse. It should not, 
however, permit classification as abuse of incidents and injuries that do not cause such impairments. 
There are no perfect parents, and everyone can imagine themselves to be damaged even by exceptional 
ones. Routine childhood injuries, whether these are physical or emotional, are not what maltreatment 
law was or ought to be designed to address. 
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intervention, and to penetrate the boundaries of family privacy only when there 
is good reason to believe that the former is more weighty than the latter.195 
B. Suggestions for Policy Reform 
Consistent with this argument, policy reforms that can ameliorate the three 
negative effects targeted by this article—the failure of existing law to satisfy its 
expressive function, inconsistent outcomes, and a risk of false-positive and 
false-negative findings of maltreatment—include changes to the structure of 
some child-abuse statutes and clarification of their included terms. Some of the 
following recommendations reflect existing best practices in statutory language 
and court or CPS practice. Others reflect a rejection of existing practices or the 
development of alternatives that better conform to the premises underlying the 
corporal-punishment exception and the scientific evidence that supports the 
resolution of individual cases. The model corporal-punishment provision 
concluding this section demonstrates how the recommendations can work 
together to provide the relevant legal actors with a systematic approach to 
drawing the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse that 
reconciles parental-autonomy norms and scientific evidence. 
1. Structure 
Corporal-punishment exceptions to child-abuse provisions should be made 
to track the common-law privilege; that is, the exception should be available for 
discipline only, and then only for force that is reasonable.196 The two-pronged 
standard makes better policy sense than approaches that focus or appear to 
focus only on the reasonableness of the force used because it is the most 
accurate and thus most helpful statement of the applicable law, and because it 
emphasizes (or brings into the equation) the oft-forgotten threshold condition 
for the privilege: that it is ultimately in the child’s interest that the force be 
used.197 Conversely, this standard makes clear that the privilege does not apply 
in circumstances that are not in the child’s interests, for example, when a parent 
 
 195. Many CPS professionals are not aware of or else reject this balancing test. See, e.g., interview 
by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS frontline investigator, 
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (explaining that CPS’s job is to protect 
children, not to safeguard parents’ rights). They may believe that respect for family privacy and 
parental autonomy only hurt children, or at least those children they are assigned to investigate. See 
Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 415–16. In fact, however, the overriding presumption in 
American law is that parents act in the best interests of their children until proven otherwise. Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). This means that CPS interventions conducted in advance of such proof 
disrupt parents’ efforts to do right by their children. CPS interventions thus are risking harm even as 
they are designed to protect against it. To the extent that this legal presumption and its logical 
ramifications reflect how society in general views the relationship between CPS and families, CPS 
professionals who ignore the balancing test are (at least) operating against that grain. Coleman, 
Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 531–38. 
 196. See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text. 
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lashes out maliciously or without motive or reason.198 In other words, when the 
discipline condition is not met, the parent has committed abuse and, in the civil 
or criminal context, an unprivileged assault or battery. Notably, the merits of 
this traditional doctrine are reinforced by scientific findings that children are 
more likely to suffer functional impairments from moderate corporal 
punishment when they do not perceive a legitimate disciplinary motive.199 
2. Burden of Proof 
The state should have the burden of alleging and proving that a parent has 
abused a child. Parents suspected of child abuse who believe that their conduct 
is appropriately protected by the corporal-punishment exception are 
responsible for raising this claim and for producing some supporting evidence, 
including specific evidence tending to show that discipline was appropriate and 
that the force used was reasonable in the circumstances. When a parent does so, 
the state has the specific burden of disproving the parent’s claim. 
Placing the ultimate burden on the state is appropriate for three reasons. 
First, regardless of whether the common-law right to use reasonable corporal 
punishment as a means of discipline is also a constitutional one, it is 
undoubtedly true that society places a premium on parental autonomy and 
family privacy, and that the strong expectation of the citizenry is these rights 
will not be violated by the state without a very good reason. Additionally, and 
again regardless of the constitutional status of the right to use corporal 
punishment, most child-maltreatment investigations implicate constitutional 
limits on state searches and seizures, including the requirement that the state 
establish a likelihood of maltreatment before it intervenes.200 Second, most CPS 
investigations result in a finding of no maltreatment. At the same time, the 
investigations cause or risk causing at least some emotional harm to the child 
and family.201 Incentivizing the state’s consideration of these concerns before it 
intervenes in the family should help to reduce the harm caused or risked by 
 
 198. Older statutory language often made this caveat express, and similar language has found its 
way into some judicial decisions. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1985) (“So taken for granted that it tends to be neglected by the case law and legal literature, is that the 
force truly be used in the exercise of domestic authority by way of punishing or disciplining the child—
for the betterment of the child or promotion of the child’s welfare—and not be a gratuitous attack.”); 
see also, e.g., Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 348 (Md. App. Ct. 1978) (“On the other hand, where 
corporal punishment was inflicted with ‘a malicious desire to cause pain’ or where it amounted to ‘cruel 
and outrageous’ treatment of the child, the chastisement was deemed unreasonable, thus defeating the 
parental privilege and subjecting the parent to penal sanctions in those circumstances where criminal 
liability would have existed absent the parent-child relationship.”). 
 199. Kirby Deater-Deckard, Kenneth Dodge & Emma Sorbring, Cultural Differences in the Effects 
of Physical Punishment, in ETHNICITY AND CAUSAL MECHANISMS 204, 211 (Michael Rutter & Marta 
Tienda eds., 2005). 
 200. See Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 3, at 471–76 (discussing the courts’ insistence that 
CPS investigations are subject to the Fourth Amendment, their disagreement about the standard that 
applies in that context, the reasonable suspicion administrative search standard or the probable cause 
standard, and the apparent preference for the probable cause standard). 
 201. See id. at 417–19, 511–22. 
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unnecessary interventions. Third, as a practical matter, most parents do not 
have the knowledge or resources necessary to prove the standard proposed 
below, particularly the second prong: that the corporal punishment at issue does 
not cause functional impairment. The state, on the other hand, could more 
easily marshal this evidence given its expertise; furthermore, the evidence 
would mostly be reusable in its other and future cases. 
Formalizing the requirement that parents raise the corporal-punishment 
exception and provide some supporting evidence as to both prongs of the 
standard is appropriate within this context because parents would be reminded 
that the right to use corporal punishment is a special privilege, an exception to 
the usual rule that assault and battery are impermissible. This requirement, in 
turn, is good for children and families because it forces parents to consider ex 
ante their decision and whether it conforms with the norms of the community or 
legal rules otherwise. Such ex ante examination—coupled with the choice to 
conform to community norms and legal rules—can reduce the number of cases 
brought to CPS’s attention, thus obviating potentially damaging intervention in 
the family. It can also reduce the incidence of functional impairment to 
children, since impairment is unlikely when punishment is normative and 
consciously considered by parents for the express purpose of teaching the child 
in a context of a warm parent–child relationship.202 It is particularly important 
for parents and other legal actors to know, in advance of their actions, that the 
scope of the privilege to use corporal punishment is not self-defined; rather, 
precisely because it is a privilege based in common-law doctrine that itself refers 
to community norms, those norms will influence when others choose to report, 
when CPS chooses to intervene, and, if the courts do get involved, how they 
resolve the case.203 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the inevitable tension between laws 
that are based in community norms and the nonconforming practices of 
minority members of the community. In the context of this article, the law 
currently permits “reasonable” corporal punishment, reasonableness 
traditionally being defined according to community norms.204 This law is and has 
always been problematic for those in the community whose norms diverge, for 
example, because of differing religious or cultural beliefs. The difficulty will 
likely be exacerbated in the future, as community norms about the 
reasonableness of corporal punishment evolve increasingly to restrict its 
permutations and use.205 Our proposal to make functional impairment the basis 
for line-drawing between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse should 
ameliorate this problem. That is, although the normativeness of corporal 
punishment would continue to play a significant role in the analysis, the weight 
 
 202. See supra notes 180–184 and 190–191 and accompanying text. 
 203. Even if the right were based in the Federal Constitution, however, community norms would 
likely continue to govern its scope. See supra notes 129–135 and 142–149 and accompanying text.  
 204. See infra note 207 (describing how reasonableness as a standard is developed in law). 
 205. See supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text (describing this evolution). 
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associated with this factor would be systematically checked by evidence of 
actual harm to the child. Thus, for example, the state would be unable to prove 
abuse if it could not prove functional impairment. The state’s assumptions 
about the unusual being bad would, in such a case, be proven incorrect. Of 
course, regardless of the normativeness of the practice, abuse would be found 
on evidence of functional impairment. 206 
3. Explanation of the Discipline Requirement 
The first prong of our proposed two-pronged corporal-punishment rule 
requires an evaluation of the propriety of discipline in the circumstances. The 
propriety of discipline should be judged objectively; that is, the decision that the 
circumstances preceding the use of force required discipline must have been a 
reasonable one. We contemplate that reasonableness in these circumstances is, 
as it always is in the law, either a factual finding about the acceptability of the 
decision according to community norms, or, in the alternative, a legal ruling 
about what the community’s norms ought to be.207 In doing so, we reject a 
different approach that would defer to parents on this question, because such 
deference is ultimately a statement that a disciplinary purpose is not really a 
condition of the exception. 
In the vast majority of cases, the parent’s decision that discipline (or some 
form of parental intervention) is warranted will be acceptable to the court, so 
the discipline prong will not often be contested. The court will likely accept the 
parent’s decision because most parents who use corporal punishment are not 
malicious, uncaring, or acting in complicated developmental circumstances, and 
because most cases that come to the attention of the authorities involve a child 
who has transgressed in some way that the community would agree warrants 
discipline. The only question in these cases, then, is whether the force used was 
reasonable. 
 
 206. See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text (discussing the scientific evidence concerning 
the link between normativeness and functional impairment) and infra notes 215–223 and accompanying 
text (describing the role that normativeness plays in our proposals for reform). 
 207. Reasonableness in law is thus either consistent with existing community norms or else 
aspirational. In the former, more typical case, the determination whether something is reasonable is 
made by the trier of fact, usually the jury. When a norm has been established by the jury over a series of 
cases, judges may decline in future similar cases to submit the question to another jury on the ground 
that the matter has been amply settled. In the latter, more-atypical case, the determination whether 
something is reasonable is taken away from the jury by the judge on the ground that community norms 
are ultimately unacceptable. See, e.g., Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995) (deciding the 
question whether AIDS phobia was reasonable “as a matter of law,” thus removing it from the jury’s 
consideration, on the basis that the state should not be in the business of sanctioning such phobia no 
matter how normative). In suggesting that judges ought to continue to be permitted to decide what a 
community’s norms ought to be—as prevailing reasonableness analysis does—we do not propose that 
they be given the leeway to codify their personal opinions; indeed, we specifically reject this as 
unreasonable. Rather, we propose that they be authorized to prohibit even normative forms of corporal 
punishment when these are scientifically proven to cause functional impairment. The example we have 
already used of such a case is SBS, which is still normative in some situations but which, based on 
scientific evidence, ought to be prohibited always. See supra notes 158–166 and 209–210 and 
accompanying text (discussing SBS in this context). 
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Formally establishing the requirement that discipline be warranted remains 
essential, however, to addressing those infrequent instances when parents do 
act out of malice or a lack of caring, as well as those circumstances in which a 
child or category of children cannot benefit from and may even be significantly 
harmed by the disciplinary effort. Examples of the latter include infants and 
some special-needs children who, because of their level of brain development or 
pathology, simply cannot make the connection between their conduct and the 
physical force that follows. This inability to understand cause and effect is 
significant because children may become functionally impaired as a result of 
even moderate levels of corporal punishment that they cannot understand as 
being for their own good.208 Perhaps the most well-known example of the use of 
science in this context is SBS.209 Without a formal construct in which to argue 
that discipline is appropriate (reasonable or unreasonable) in the circumstances, 
the relevance of such evidence may not be apparent to the maltreatment 
inquiry. 
Several states have chosen to codify the common-law standard as we 
suggest, as a two-pronged test requiring that accused parents establish both a 
disciplinary motive and the reasonableness of the force used.210 As to the first, 
disciplinary prong, some states require a finding that discipline be reasonable in 
the circumstances, whereas others require a finding of necessity.211 The necessity 
standard places a much higher burden on parents: it is literally the difference 
between having to establish that the community would or should find a 
particular discipline acceptable and that the community would or should find 
such discipline necessary. 
For the following reasons, we strongly suggest adoption of the 
reasonableness standard. First, the need for discipline in many instances is a 
judgment call whose merits cannot be established with precision, perhaps 
particularly by outsiders to the family. Unlike the necessity standard, the 
reasonableness standard permits the fact-finder to defer to parents’ judgment so 
long as it is within the range of acceptable decisions. Second, society continues 
to support parents’ right to use corporal punishment, ensuring that normative 
discipline—discipline that meets the reasonableness standard—generally will 
not cause functional impairment. Third, the necessity standard risks 
unnecessary and potentially harmful interventions in the family, an effect that 
designers of maltreatment law ought to avoid whenever possible. 
 
 208. See supra notes 102, 115–120 and accompanying text. 
 209. For a description of SBS and its effects, see supra notes 158–166 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 211. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-503(2)(C)(1) (“‘Abuse’ shall not include physical discipline 
of a child when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent or guardian for purposes of 
restraining or correcting the child.”), with In re T.A., 663 N.W.2d 225, 230 (S.D. 2003) (considering 
whether a parent’s discipline of his child was “rendered necessary” by the child’s actions). 
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4. Explanation of the Requirement that the Force Used Be Reasonable 
The second prong of our proposed two-pronged corporal punishment 
requires an evaluation of the reasonableness of the force used. If the state can 
prove that the use of force in the circumstances was unreasonable, it has 
established that child abuse occurred. The basis for evaluating this second 
prong ought to be whether what the parent has done has caused or risks causing 
functional impairment. 
Again, functional impairment refers to short-term, long-term, or permanent 
impairment of emotional or physical functioning.212 Scientific evidence about 
which parenting behaviors lead to functional impairment supports the formal 
incorporation of several factors into this aspect of the reasonableness inquiry: 
the severity of the physical injury that results from parental conduct; whether 
the parent’s conduct is normative; the proportionality of the conduct in relation 
to the child’s transgression; the manner in which the punishment is 
administered, which includes consideration of the location of the child’s injuries 
and whether any objects were used; chronicity, meaning the frequency of the 
corporal punishment; and transparency and consistency, or whether the child 
knows the rules that will result in punishment and whether the parent 
administers those rules non-arbitrarily.213 Aside from the severity criterion, all of 
the factors force examination of the context in which the corporal punishment 
occurs and of the child’s reaction to that context.214 Depending upon the 
circumstances, any one of these factors alone or two or more factors in 
combination might suffice to characterize parental conduct as unreasonable. 
For example, a one-time incident in which a parent strikes a child so hard that a 
bone breaks will be severe enough on its own to cause or risk causing functional 
impairment, so there would be no need to establish the existence or weight of 
the remaining factors. Conversely, moderate (more than mild, less than severe) 
corporal punishment will generally be insufficient on its own to cause functional 
impairment; only if it is coupled with other factors—for example, a lack of 
proportionality, transparency and consistency, or chronicity—can moderate 
corporal punishment be predicted to cause functional impairment. 
Although all of these factors play a potentially significant role in the analysis 
of individual cases, the question whether the manner and degree of punishment 
is normative is relevant in all cases. Nonnormative corporal punishment is more 
likely than normative corporal punishment to result in functional impairment.215 
Thus, if an incident of corporal punishment is normative, it is and ought to be 
less likely to result in a finding of abuse, and vice versa. Of course, some 
nonnormative behavior will neither cause nor risk functional impairment and 
some normative behavior will cause or risk causing functional impairment. 
Some religiously motivated corporal punishments may fall into the former 
 
 212. See supra notes 26, 28, 43–46, 61, 102, 115–119, 131–35 and accompanying text.  
 213. See supra III.B. 
 214. See supra notes 167–191 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text. 
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category, and SBS is (again) a good example of a practice that falls into the 
latter. In such cases, normativeness should not be determinative. 
Normativeness is already central to how reporters, CPS, and judges decide 
reasonableness; such actors are more likely to view what is unusual to or 
different for them (based on community culture or personal orientation) as 
abuse—indeed, in some jurisdictions, it may be the predominant criterion.216 
Abnormality is also an empirical criterion, in that norms are defined by the rate 
of use in a particular culture or society.217 Using empirical data as a check on 
personal views or current practices can reduce the incidence of ad hoc “know it 
when you see it” fact-finding, and thus standardize what is and is not considered 
normative, at least within individual communities or jurisdictions.218 Entirely 
apart from its usefulness to reduce ad hoc fact-finding, this particular use of 
scientific evidence is important because what is normative in terms of corporal 
punishment is rapidly shifting, and as a result, practitioners may not be as aware 
of actual current normative practice as they believe they are. Empirical 
knowledge about changes in social norms and parenting practices is becoming 
more readily available and should be communicated to practitioners, lawyers, 
and judges regularly. 
A problem in the implementation of the normativeness criterion is that the 
frequency and tolerance of corporal-punishment practices varies across 
jurisdictions, cultural groups, and time. Parents employ different corporal-
punishment practices across the world. Spanking with a bare hand across the 
buttocks is relatively common in the United States, whereas in other cultures, 
different practices are relatively common, such as beating with a stick, “coining” 
a child by rolling a hot coin across the back, and forcing a child to swallow hot 
peppers.219 Practices vary across jurisdictions even within the United States. 
Corporal punishment itself is more common in the South than the North, 
among African American families than European American families, and 
among lower socioeconomic-status families than middle- and higher-status 
families.220 Also, religious cultural groups may encourage or discourage specific 
practices, creating the possibility that a parent will find the use of a corporal-
punishment practice to be normative within a narrow religious culture even 
though it is unusual in the broader society. Further, cultural norms have 
changed across generations. Parents sometimes defend their corporal-
punishment practices based on the family norm they experienced growing up, 
 
 216. See supra notes 1, 3, 8, and 80–88 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 1 and 182–184 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of ad hoc factfinding). 
 219. For a discussion of these and other “nonnormative” disciplines, see Renteln, supra note 4, at § 
IV. 
 220. Kirby Deater-Deckard & Kenneth A. Dodge, Externalizing Behavior Problems and Discipline 
Revisited: Nonlinear Effects and Variation by Culture, Context, and Gender, 8 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 161, 
163 (1997) (noting the cultural and socio-economic differences). Kirby Deater-Deckard et al., supra 
note 176, at 1071 (concluding about the differences between regions within the United States). 
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even in the face of a contemporary societal prohibition.221 Defining a parental 
practice as “reasonable” based on cultural normativeness is complicated by 
these varying norms. Without specific statutory guidance, CPS and the courts 
must decide which cultural norm to apply (from that of the society at large, the 
individual’s actual familial or cultural frame of reference, or the norm to which 
the judge aspires for the society) when determining the reasonableness of a 
particular disciplinary incident. 
Resolving how a legislature ought to define the reference community for the 
purposes of establishing the normativeness of a particular manner or degree of 
corporal punishment is beyond the scope of this article. But we encourage 
serious consideration of the question, and in particular, a focus on the different 
implications of a decision to base normativeness on the views of the broader 
community in which the family lives or on those of the family’s particular 
community—the immediate or extended family, including its affiliations, 
religious and otherwise. Specifically, a decision to base normativeness on the 
views of the broader community would assure that all children and families are 
treated similarly under the law, an outcome consistent with equal-protection 
doctrine and the antidiscrimination norms at its foundation.222 It would also 
mean, however, that at least in some cases—particularly those involving 
younger children who are still members only of their parents’ world—the 
maltreatment finding would be based on a larger group norm that is in fact 
nonnormative for the child. In other words, the law would create the fiction that 
the parent’s conduct was nonnormative when, for that child, it would be 
precisely the contrary. Because it is the child’s perspective on normativeness 
that matters for purposes of functional impairment, application of this rule to 
children in this category would be inconsistent with their welfare. In contrast, 
basing the normativeness finding on the parents’ particular community would 
assure that the finding is consistent with the child’s point of view—and thus a 
better predictor of functional impairment—but only so long as the child is too 
young to be or does not choose to be a member of the broader community and 
a beneficiary of its different norms. Ultimately, we believe that defining 
normativeness must depend on the political culture and practical resources of 
the state or locality responsible for defining the standards by which abuse will 
be judged.223 
Finally, although lists of illustrative violations in statutory definitions and 
CPS protocols may help to reduce parents’ and reporters’ concerns about the 
 
 221. See, e.g., supra note 88. 
 222. See generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: 
The Liberal’s Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996). 
 223. For example, some jurisdictions with both extensive non-conforming immigrant communities 
and the political will and resources to work to reconcile those practices with broader community norms 
and applicable law have incorporated sensitivity to cultural difference in their CPS protocols and have 
trained their professionals accordingly. On the other hand, jurisdictions that are unaccustomed to non-
conforming immigrants or are unwilling to work to understand their different practices have not 
engaged such efforts. 
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breadth and vagueness of typical child-abuse definitions, the listed behaviors do 
not necessarily correspond with harm or functional impairment. For example, a 
parent’s choice to hit a child on the face or to put pepper in a child’s mouth 
might trigger scrutiny and even substantiation according to an illustrative list in 
a particular state or county,224 but may not result in harm if other criteria such as 
severity or chronicity are absent. Illustrative lists may thus cause a mixed bag of 
outcomes that are good—increasing predictability and consistency—and bad—
intervention in the family that is unnecessary to protect a child from harm. 
Because they do some important good, however, and because their contents 
often reflect nonnormative parenting, either in fact or aspirationally, we do not 
suggest that they be eliminated. Rather, we encourage their treatment as 
potentially contributing to rather than as automatically dispositive of the line 
between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse. 
5. Evidence 
Standard evidence law applicable to judicial proceedings provides that “all 
relevant evidence is admissible”; “relevant evidence” means “evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.”225 This law further provides that 
if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.226 
Although the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse is 
drawn initially by CPS and only sometimes and subsequently in a judicial 
proceeding, the practice required by and principles underlying these rules ought 
to apply throughout the process. Both CPS and the courts ought to consider all 
 
 224. See Stephen D. Whitney et al., Defining Child Abuse: Exploring Variations in Ratings of 
Discipline Severity Among Child Welfare Practitioners, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 316, 
323 (2006) (including these practices or behaviors as among those most likely to trigger CPS scrutiny); 
interview by Kenneth A. Dodge and Doriane Lambelet Coleman with a county CPS supervisor, 
Durham County, N.C. (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with L & CP) (noting that its agency’s protocol requires a 
finding of abuse when a parent seeks to corporally punish a child anywhere on the head). 
 225. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. The states’ own rules mirror the Federal Rules in these respects. 
See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.”); ALA. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or that of the State of 
Alabama, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this State. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible.”). None of the standard exceptions to this rule apply to exclude 
consideration of the scientific and other evidence described in this article. 
 226. FED. R. EVID. 702. The states’ rules on expert testimony are similar. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 
702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”). 
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relevant evidence as they make findings in individual cases, including but not 
limited to reliable scientific evidence. 
The line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse is not fixed or 
easily identified, particularly in cases at the margins. No scientific or case 
evidence can identify with absolute accuracy the precise point at which corporal 
punishment becomes abuse. Nevertheless, more consistent and accurate results 
can be achieved if CPS and the courts have access to, understand, and use as 
much relevant and reliable evidence as possible. This evidence includes 
empirical findings about community norms and practices from both lay 
witnesses and survey experts, as well as scientific evidence that describes the 
contexts that cause children to suffer functional impairments.227 This evidence 
should be used to evaluate both the reasonableness of discipline and the 
reasonableness of the force used—in other words, to evaluate the merits of both 
prongs of the corporal-punishment standard. Thus, in order to fulfill their 
professional obligations, case workers, prosecutors, and judges should be 
regularly educated about the status of scientific evidence in child abuse and be 
trained to interpret that evidence.  
CPS appears in general to be much more comfortable than the courts with a 
variety of evidence, including with scientific evidence. What is not clear, though, 
is whether those agencies and professionals that incorporate emotional and 
developmental consequences into their assessments are using only valid 
scientific evidence about those consequences. At least some case workers 
appear to be using a combination of valid evidence, intuition, or presumed 
knowledge about the nonphysical sequelae of physical injuries. In addition, in 
their eagerness to help children exposed to what they perceive to be suboptimal 
conditions, at least some workers appear willing to classify as abuse incidents 
and injuries that have not or are unlikely to cause functional impairment. 
Considering emotional and developmental consequences is essential to the 
 
 227. Part III.B elaborates on the contexts that cause children to suffer functional impairments. 
Evidence of the presence of these contexts is thus relevant to establishing child abuse. Discerning 
functional impairment is easiest in circumstances where children are old enough to express their 
concerns, or else to exhibit failures or inabilities in the exercise of their daily activities. It is more 
difficult in circumstances where children are either chronologically or developmentally younger, 
because how well they are functioning in their daily lives is much less susceptible to lay observation. It 
is thus essential that valid expertise be brought to bear on both the actual and probabilistic effects of 
parental behavior in infants and toddlers. Thus, for example, immediate functional impairment could 
be assessed by a medical or psychological examination of the child’s current status. Future functional 
impairment is (in all contexts) an estimate that has a probability attached to it, for example: highly 
likely, somewhat likely, unlikely to be impaired in a domain such as academic, mental health, or daily 
living. This probability is based on matching the parent’s behavior and child’s current status with a 
scientific literature that says “if the parent’s behavior is x and the child’s current status is y, then the 
likelihood is z that the child will be impaired in the future.” Although probabilistic evaluations are, by 
definition, less certain and thus more likely than current status to result in errors, they are necessary 
unless society is willing to forgo interventions in the family to protect children who are (merely) at risk 
of maltreatment. Assuming that society is not willing to forego such interventions, it is better—errors 
will be reduced—if this evaluation is based or substantially relies on valid scientific evidence. Currently, 
there is no such requirement. 
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analysis, but it is also essential that these consequences be legitimate and 
serious. CPS ought to be required to use only that evidence from laypersons 
and experts that meets rigorous validity standards. 
Courts appear less likely than CPS to be comfortable with scientific 
evidence that is not related to the medical facts surrounding a particular 
physical injury. In particular, courts and the lawyers practicing before them 
sometimes appear uninterested in or uncomfortable with scientific evidence 
about nonphysical sequelae. To some extent this discomfort is due to the 
exclusive focus of statutory abuse definitions—either in plain text or as 
interpreted by other courts in the jurisdiction—on the child’s physical injuries. 
Separately, however, it appears that judges and lawyers do not know what to 
make of CPS’s claims about emotional and developmental evidence. This 
uncertainty may be based on their sense that this evidence lacks the indicia of 
validity necessary in judicial proceedings, or because the law traditionally 
struggles with claims about emotional damage, both inside and outside of the 
maltreatment context.228 Whatever the case, requiring relevance and validity 
consistent with the rules of evidence, and making clear the doctrinal contexts in 
which the evidence is to be presented, is essential to its acceptability and utility 
for these legal actors. 
The requirement that practitioners, lawyers, and courts use valid scientific 
evidence to decide whether cases involve reasonable corporal punishment or 
abuse necessarily implicates the need for experts to be part of the process. This, 
in turn, raises the question whether our approach is realistic given the system’s 
already-limited human and financial resources. We acknowledge that scientific 
expertise is not free and thus that our proposal will introduce new costs into the 
system. At the same time, we suggest that these costs are worth bearing if they 
can fix the problems inherent in the current process, specifically its tendency to 
produce inconsistent and erroneous outcomes. Like other evidence, once 
certain scientific facts are accepted and established, they will be admissible or 
judicially noticed without the involvement of costly experts, thus ensuring that 
whatever costs are added are reduced over time. Moreover, adoption of this 
proposal should result in some cost savings—for example, by forcing CPS to 
concentrate its resources more narrowly on the cases involving functional 
impairment—that will offset some if not all of the cost increases. In other 
words, we believe that our approach is both necessary and realistic, the latter 
particularly if policymakers are willing to view the additional costs in their 
broader context. 
 
 228. Although the law today generally recognizes claims for emotional harm, its traditional concerns 
about frivolous and fraudulent claims and about how to limit liability in such a way that the outcome is 
fair also to the defendant continue to affect their viability and usefulness. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
7B-101(1)(e) (2007) (providing that an “[a]bused juvenile” includes a child “whose parent, guardian, 
custodian, or caretaker . . . [c]reates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile” 
which “is evidenced by a juvenile’s severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior 
toward himself or others”) (emphasis added); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978) 
(making these points about the need to limit the scope of civil claims for emotional-distress damages). 
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6. Model Corporal-Punishment Provision 
The following model corporal-punishment provision is based on the 
structure and principles articulated above. It is designed to be used in the civil 
child-maltreatment context. However, with some modification, its terms may 
also be applicable to criminal maltreatment investigations and proceedings. 
Because it substantially mirrors the common-law tort standard and is otherwise 
consistent with standard evidence law, it also can be applied in that setting. 
Although these three areas of law have some different objectives and concerns, 
there is merit to a jurisdiction’s considering adoption of a single unified rule, as 
doing so would send a consistent message to the relevant legal actors—
including parents, CPS, and judges—about the state’s position on corporal 
punishment. This single rule, in turn, would potentially reduce the number of 
incidents in which children were injured in the disciplinary setting and, 
correspondingly, the number of interventions by the state in the family. 
 
Model Corporal-Punishment Provision 
1. A nonaccidental physical assault on a child is child abuse unless it is privileged or 
excused. 
2. Privileges and Excuses 
A. The Privilege of Reasonable Corporal Punishment. A parent is privileged to 
use physical force to discipline his or her child so long as 
(i) he or she is reasonable in determining that the child’s behavior 
warranted discipline, and 
(ii) the force used is reasonable in nature and moderate in degree. Force is 
reasonable in nature and moderate in degree if it does not cause or risk 
causing functional impairment. Functional impairment means short- or 
long-term or permanent impairment of physical or emotional functioning 
in tasks of daily living. 
B. The “De Minimis” Exception. A parent who does not have a reasonable 
disciplinary motive for his or her conduct but who does not cause his or her child 
more than minimal harm will not be charged with child abuse. 
3. Burden of Proof. A parent charged with assaulting his or her child bears the burden 
of asserting and producing some evidence to support the assertion that the assault was 
privileged or excused. When a parent meets this burden, the state is required to prove 
that the assault was not privileged or excused. 
4. Evidence 
A. Any evidence is admissible and should be considered in the evaluation of 
individual cases that is relevant to establishing that 
(i) an assault occurred or did not occur; 
(ii) discipline was or was not appropriate in the circumstances; 
(iii) the force used was or was not reasonable in the circumstances; and/or 
(iv) any harm caused to the child was or was not within the de minimis 
exception. 
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B. Relevant evidence includes, among other things, evidence of traditional 
parenting practices and scientific evidence (both medical and social-science 
evidence) that is proffered to provide assistance to the court in understanding 
the effects of discipline and force in the circumstances. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding efforts in some states to narrow their scope, legal 
definitions of abuse and neglect continue in general to be broad and vague. 
Among other things, this means that the line between reasonable corporal 
punishment and abuse itself tends to be ill-defined. This ambiguity has been 
rationalized primarily on the ground that the state needs flexible definitions to 
ensure that it can act to protect children from maltreatment in whatever form it 
may appear. 
Although flexibility is certainly a valid concern, an important ancillary effect 
is that this ill-defined standard abdicates to the relevant legal actors—parents, 
reporters, CPS professionals, and the courts—the job of defining maltreatment, 
and thus also the boundaries of reasonable corporal punishment. Not 
surprisingly, each of these definers is constrained differently, if not by formal 
rules, then by cultural, political, religious, and professional training. Parents and 
lay reporters typically operate on a “know it when you see it” basis, whereas 
CPS professionals and courts are somewhat, but not ever entirely, constrained 
in this exercise by the norms of their respective disciplines, social work, and law. 
Thus, current law fails to give useful guidance to its intended audience, and it 
provides for inconsistent case outcomes and an unacceptable risk of both false-
positive and false-negative errors. 
The line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse will never be 
exact. But the states can do a much better job of constraining decisionmakers to 
ensure both that they are only targeting parental behaviors and outcomes for 
the child that justify intrusions on family privacy, and that these circumstances 
are consistent and publicly accessible. To these ends, this article contributes to 
the literature on the subject of broad and vague abuse definitions in law and the 
social sciences by proposing a legislative solution to the problem of where and 
how to draw the line between reasonable corporal punishment and 
maltreatment that is grounded in long-standing parental-autonomy norms and 
informed by the science that teaches when and how children suffer harm. 
Specifically, it proposes the adoption of a standard for reasonable corporal 
punishment that requires both a reasonable disciplinary motive and reasonable 
force, and it defines reasonableness according to both normative 
understandings and scientific evidence of capacity and functional impairment. 
As a theoretical matter, this standard reflects appropriate recognition of the 
societal significance of parental rights and responsibilities and permits 
intervention in the family only when there is evidence of important physical, 
emotional, or developmental harm to the child. And as a practical matter, it 
continues to provide the state with the flexibility necessary to target even 
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unusual forms of maltreatment, while simultaneously clarifying the 
circumstances that will and should trigger state action. This, in turn, should 
result in more consistent case outcomes as well as fewer false-positive and false-
negative findings of maltreatment. 
 
